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ABSTRACT
The problems of dwindling investment capital, financial mismanagement;
inappropriate investment policies; operational, institutional, and environmental
deficiencies have forced many developing nations scrambling to search for solutions.
Privatization-the transfer of ownership of state-owned assets to the private sector-has
arguably been the most sought-after recipe by willing policy makers in developing
countries since it swept Chile, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom in the 1980s.
This thesis argues that transfer of assets of state-owned electric utilities to the
private sector is not an economic necessity per se if policies allowing for competitive
procurement of electricity provision and the state's adherence to non-interventionism can
coexist with state ownership. This argument is drawn from a model that analyzes the
relationships among a country's economic and political endowments, production
structure of energy service provision, operational efficiency and service quality.
In developing countries, however, the general lack of regulatory capacity and
transparency in decision-making makes the latter an unforeseeable alternative. Against
this backdrop, private provision of electricity becomes an imperative when the objectives
are to improve both the efficiency of service provision and to attract private capital.
Private ownership of divested public assets backed by competition-sufficient to
challenge market power-and minimal regulation would be an ideal combination for a
growing electric industry.
Attracting private investment in the power sector is the next big challenge for
developing countries. This thesis argues that private capital that is devoid of country risk
and project risk guarantees will always be cheaper. This would mean that project
developers would have to put their balance sheets at risk. Local capital markets provide
the platform for project developers to exchange their debt and equity for cash and exit the
market. To examine the level of level of development of capital markets, a financial
model is formulated to investigate the extent of maturity of emerging capital markets of
six developing countries-Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Malaysia, Philippines, and South
Korea-and its relationship with electricity stock capitalization, net foreign direct
investment, and international loans. It is found that emerging capital market will depend
more on international loans/bonds and foreign direct investment to expand itself. In
contrast, a matured capital market would be in a position to mobilize domestic capital to
finance infrastructure investments.
Power utility restructuring and private-sector financing reinforce each other.
These items, therefore, need to go together in any comprehensive macroeconomic reform
package that is being carried out in many parts of the world.
1. WHY RESTRUCTURE?
1.1 The Dilemma
The power systems of developing and industrial countries alike shared similar
characteristics before the oil crisis of 1973-74. They were growing rapidly, and supplying
power at declining real prices.' Improvements in system performance made by industrial
countries through economies of scale and thermal efficiency would, in general, always
find their ways into developing countries with some time lag. When the oil crisis struck
developing country consumers and, to a large extent, utilities failed to respond. Costs
escalated but real prices did not increase accordingly; social and political considerations
led many governments in developing countries to reduce the impact of rising electricity
prices on consumers mostly through subsidies.2
The pressures of rapidly increasing electricity demand and reduced cash flows
ultimately led utilities to borrow heavily to finance their investments. Loans were
generally taken at international financial markets where interest rates were relatively low.
In the 1980s, however, the interruption of international flow of capital into developing
countries and the simultaneous increase in interest rates caused by industrial countries'
monetary policies forced the former to undertake large devaluations of domestic
currencies. These devaluations led to increased utility debts and rendered many of them
insolvent.
Utilities, which were mostly state-owned, had to rely on government coffers to
solve their financial difficulties. The burgeoning debt crisis, however, destroyed the
financial equilibrium of most developing country public accounts: the problems that
treasuries had in subsidizing utilities was compounded by the additional dilemma that
'Mason, M., Gilling, J., Munasinghe, M.; A review of World Bank lending for electric
power, World Bank, Washington DC, 1988.2 Oliveira, Adilson de and MacKerron, Gordon; Is the World Bank approach to structural
reform supported by experience of electricity privatization in the UK?, Energy Policy,
February 1992.
3 OLADE, The foreign debt of the energy sector of Latin American and the Carribean,
Quito, Ecuador, 1988.
utilities absorbed huge amounts of foreign exchange but were unable to earn any. Further
capital investments and maintenance expenditures were thus postponed. Financial and
technological performance further deteriorated. Blackouts and brownouts collectively
became a part of life for both residential and industrial consumers.4
1.2 The Evidence
Several factors contributed to the developing country's power sector to recede
further into financial and institutional unviability. Huge investment capital requirements,
poor financial performance through misplaced pricing policies, operational, managerial,
institutional, and environmental issues are chief among them.
1.2.1 Requirements for investment capital
An investment amounting to US$1 trillion (in 1993 dollars) would be required in
the decade of the nineties if developing countries are to finance investments to meet their
projected demand growth of power. In terms of installed capacity, another 384 GW-
equivalent to an increase in 80% above the 1989 level-would need to be added by the
turn of this century. Of the direct investment needed by the utilities themselves, about
US$40 billion annually would be required in foreign exchange; the other US$60 billion
would have to come from domestic capital sources. Raising the latter, however, will be
no easy task.s In most of the developing countries the local capital markets, if they exist
at all, are embryonic at present. The experience of the 1980s suggest that these huge sums
will not be forthcoming. Official financing agencies, such as the World Bank, in recent
years have supplied approximately US$7 billion per year.6 It is unlikely that these official
flows will be substantially increased, given the many other claims on these types of funds
from other economic sectors (or from Eastern Europe and Russia, for that matter). Private
4 See footnote 2.
1 Almost 85% of these domestic capital requirements will have to be raised in just two
countries: India and China: Moore, Edwin A. and Smith, George, Capital Expenditures
for Electric Power in Developing Countries in the 1990s, World Bank Industry and
Energy Department Energy Series Working Paper No 21, Washington, DC, 1990.
6 Schramm, Gunter, Electric power in developing countries: status, problems, prospects,
Annual Review of Energy 1990, Annual Reviews Inc., Palo Alto, CA, 1990.
foreign financing agencies that until the early 1980s had supplied the bulk of foreign
exchange sector funding (usually via direct loans to the respective governments) had
largely withdrawn from lending by the mid-1980s, given the mounting difficulties of may
of the LDCs' governments in servicing their debts. These, by that time, included some
US$60 billion of publicly guaranteed power loans.
Against this backdrop, some of the options to tackle the problem of lacking
investment capital include: doing less (i.e., increasing operational and financial
efficiency);7 opting for less costly rehabilitation instead of construction of new facilities;8
rearranging investment priorities; increasing revenues (via higher tariffs, improved
collection methods, reduction of non-technical losses); and commercialization and/or
private-sector participation. We will pick up on the last option in depth in Chapter 2.
1.2.2 Poor financial performance
Directly linked to the problem of raising investment capital, as well as to
problems of inadequate performance, is the poor financial performance of the majority of
publicly owned developing country power utilities. Average financial rates of return were
less than 5% between 1987 and 1989, having fallen to as little as 2.8% in 1989.9 Clearly,
from a financial perspective, an industry whose rate of return is consistently below the
market interest rates can hardly expect to be welcomed in domestic or world financial
markets. 'o
Poor financial performance of the power industry does not only affect it ability to
raise investment capital. The lack of adequate income has an even more deleterious effect
7 Jhirad, David, Implementing power sector solutions in developing countries, Paper
prepared for the Conference of the Stockholm Initiative on Energy, Environment and
Sustainable Development (SEED), Stockholm, 13-14 November 1991.
' United Nations (UNCTAD) New York, and Exportradet, Swedish Trade Council,
Stockholm, United Nations Seminar on Energy Conservation in Developing Countries,
Executive Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations, Stockholm, 3-9 September
1989.
9 World Bank, Infrastructure and Energy Division, and OLADE, The Evolution, Situation,
and Prospects of the Electric Power Sector in the Latin American and Carribean
Countries, Report No 7, Vol 1, World Bank and OLADE, Washington, DC, 1991.
1o Ibid.
on the day to day performance of the utility itself, on its inability to attract and hold
competent managerial and technical staff. The two major factors responsible for the poor
financial performance: inadequate tariffs and poor revenue collection are described next.
1.2.2.1 Inadequate tariffs
Average tariffs have drifted down from an already low US 5.21 cents/kWh in
1979 to US 3.79 cents/kWh in 1988, a reduction of some 32% in real terms." There was
no economic or financial justification for such declines; in most cases they came about
because of high rates of domestic inflation and the unwillingness of governments to
adjust tariffs accordingly. The weighted average tariffs of a sample of 63 developing
countries, expressed in 1988 US dollars, were US 4.46 cents/kWh in 1988, compared
with a weighted average for all OECD countries of US 8.07 cents/kWh, a difference of
more than 80%. While there are few utility operations in the developing world that have
inherently low cost structures (low cost hydro, short transmission lines, mainly large
volume customers), in general, on technical and economic grounds (mostly imported
equipment, less than optimal system sizes, low average consumption per connection),
average tariffs should be significantly higher in developing countries than OECD
countries in order to cover costs.12
1.2.2.2 Poor revenue collection
Poor meter reading, accounting and billing; inaccurate record keeping, lack of
meters, and non-payment by governmental organizations that cannot be disconnected are
some of the causes of poor revenue collection performance. Accounts receivable,
expressed in months outstanding, are commonly used as a measure of good or poor
revenue collection performance. Based on a sample of 51 countries taken from 1988 data,
there were a number of well performing utilities with averages of less than 1.5 months
outstanding while there were others that had averages of 15 months or more. The mean
11
12 Ibid.
average was 4.3 months. For the sake of comparison, the US average was slightly less
than 1 month."3
1.2.3 Inappropriate investment policies
A number of utilities are plagued by continuing capacity shortages, but many
others, in fact, have substantial excess generating capacity. In well run utilities, reserve
capacity margins are usually kept at somewhere between 15% and 30% above peak load,
depending on system characteristics. In the majority of developing countries, however,
the capacity reserve margins are excessive-typically between 40% and 59%. The overall
average for a sample of 70 developing countries was 43%. Relative to the 1989 total
systems load of 331 GW and a target reserve margin of 30%, this means the excess
capacity was 43 GW, representing an investment of about US$50 billion, using
$1150/kW as the weighted average mix of capital costs for hydro, thermal, nuclear and
geothermal.'4 The 43 GW capacity savings would meet two years of load growth at 6-7%
per annum. Following this line of argument, improved maintenance to increase unit
availability and reduce the capacity reserve margin to 30% could save both US$50 billion
initially and roughly US$25 billion each year (starting in year 3) in terms of future
generating investments.
While potential of huge savings exist in countries with excess generating capacity,
there has been, however, a systematic neglect of subtransmission and distribution
investments and maintenance, with the result that circuits are overloaded, voltage drops
chronic and power supplies in general highly unreliable.
1.2.4 High system losses
Any power system will incur technical losses in transmission and distribution, but
with the present technology, these losses generally range between 7% and 10%. In a
sample of 94 utilities (1988), only 8 had system losses of 11% or less;" another 34, or
slightly more than one-third, had losses ranging more between 11% and 16%, while some
13 World Bank and op cit, footnote 9, OLADE
14 Ibid.
21 showed losses in excess of 21%.16 System losses above 15-16% are almost always the
result of inaccurate and often fraudulent billing and collection systems, or of outright
theft through meter tampering or illegal connections."
1.2.5 Poor operating performance
Unreliable service and frequent outages, high voltage and frequency fluctuations,
excessive generating capacity margins, short life expectancies of plant and equipment,
high system losses, and excessive pollution loads on the environment are all various
manifestations of poor operating performance. For electricity users, failure to receive
uninterrupted electricity is by far the most costly consequence of the poor operating
performance of utilities. As has been shown in a number of studies, the cost/kWh of
electricity not supplied, when supply was expected to be forthcoming, can be, and usually
is, exceedingly high, in the order of several times the long-run marginal costs of supply.
In estimated cost/kWh, this translates to anywhere between $0.25/kWh and as much as
$12/kWh in developing countries, depending on type of use, time of day, duration,
frequency, and availability of substitutes."8
In the preceding section, we observed that developing countries had generally
ample generation capacity reserves; so why this acute shortage? In most cases it is found
that most of the generation capacity is unavailable because of breakdowns, lack of spares,
and generally poor maintenance. This is apparent from the very low generation capacity
factors achieved by the majority of developing country utilities. In a sample of 98 utilities
(1988) only 10 achieved a capacity factor of 50% or more; some 59 of them achieved
40% or less, and 14 had a factor less than 25% or less."
'~ System losses refer to combined technical and non-technical losses. They are calculated
on the basis of net generation minus total sales, divided by net generation.
16 Escay, Jose R., Summary 1988 Power Data Sheets for 100 Developing Countries,
World Bank Industry and Energy Department Energy Series Working Paper No 40,
Washington, DC, 1991.
'~ Schramm, Gunter, Technical and non-technical power losses in developing countries,
Paper presented at ELEC 88, Paris, November, 1988.
18 Schramm, Gunter, Issues and problems in the power sectors of developing countries,
Energy Policy, July 1993.
'
9 Ibid.
1.2.6 Manpower issues
Inappropriate skill mixes, overstaffing, but, at the same time, shortages of
competent middle-level management and technical staff, low staff morale, inadequate
compensation for skilled personnel with alternative employment opportunities, inability
of management to make independent hiring and firing decisions, and lack of training
facilities are some of the major issues that have been identified as root causes for poor
institutional performance. 20
Overstaffing is a serious problem in many developing countries. While the better
performing utilities have ratios of utility customers to the number of employees between
150 and 400, the poorest ones show ratios of 50 or less. Most of the overstaffing occurs in
the semi- and unskilled categories and is usually the result of heavy handed government
attempts to use the publicly owned utilities as employment pools.2 1
1.2.7 Institutional and management issues
A prevalent phenomenon that is partly, if not wholly, responsible for the poor
performance of public utilities throughout developing countries is government
interference in many organizational and operational matters that should be left under
utility control. Such intervention undermines the accountability of those responsible for
day to day management functions. It also heavily influences procurement decisions, often
opening them up for graft and corruption. Governmental, politically motivated
interference mitigates against least cost choices for plant, equipment and fuel; it distorts
the allocation of funds between rehabilitation and maintenance on the one hand, and
investment in new plant and equipment on the other; it results in the inability to raise
power tariffs to levels that would cover costs; and it restricts the utility's access to foreign
exchange. Furthermore, it mandates low utility staff salaries, often tied to civil service
pay levels rather than competitive market wages. It also promotes overstaffing, often
through no firing rules based on inappropriate civil service models. These factors, in turn,
20 Energy Development Division, Industry and Energy Department, Core Report of the
Power Utility Efficiency Improvement Study, World Bank Industry and Energy
Department Energy Series Working Paper No 46, Washington, DC, 1991.
21 Op Cit, footnote 15, Escay.
have contributed heavily to inadequate utility management and organization, lack of
accountability, the loss of experienced and capable staff due to non-competitive
employment conditions, weak planning, inefficient operation and insufficient
maintenance, high technical and non-technical losses, and weak financial monitoring,
controls and collections.22
1.3 The Solution: Ownership and Incentives
At this point, we have equipped ourselves with sufficient information to answer
the question we began this chapter with: Why restructure? This thesis-grounded on the
evidence of institutional problems described in the preceding section-will argue that
lack of incentives and accountability in developing country electric utilities is derived
from inefficiencies of their prevailing ownership structures. We borrow some of the
economic theories of firms discussed in the next section to strengthen this argument.
1.3.1 Economic Principles of Efficient Ownership
Going back to Adam Smith, when property rights over a productive asset are
clearly defined, and the person who decides how to employ this asset bears full costs and
enjoys full benefits of such employment, he puts the asset to its most productive use.23 In
the words of economists, the person has both control rights and cash flow rights over his
assets.24 Control rights include all rights to make decisions on how to use the asset such
as to lease it, sell it, or to give it away. Cash flow rights are the rights to earn benefits and
pay costs that result from a particular use of the asset. The above economic theory,
pushed forward by proponents of privatization, provides a rationale for relying on private
property as the basis for an efficient organization of economic activity in a society.
Poorly defined property rights-characterized by lack of protection of property and of
22 Op Cit, footnote 19, EPUES
23 Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, Privatizing Russia, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1995.
24 The distinction between cash flow and control rights, as well as the foundations of the
analysis that follows, are due to Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and
Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, Journal of Political
Economy 94, 1986; and Oliver D. Hart and John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature
of the Firm, Journal of Political Economy 98, 1990.
enforcement of contracts-by extension would cause inefficiency in the underlying
ownership structure.
Applying this theory to public enterprises in socialist and mixed economies, we
observe the clearest evidence of inefficiency in ownership structure: Politicians have
substantial control rights and 'the state' which usually means the treasury has all the cash
flow rights.25 Moreover, control rights may actually be split between ministers overseeing
the enterprise and the bureaucrat or manager running the enterprise. In some cases, the
manager has some cash flow rights because he is on an incentive contract tied to the
profits of the firm. In practice, such incentive contracts are extremely uncommon, and,
even in a few cases where they have been tried, politicians overseeing the enterprises
have quickly repealed them once managers actually tried to maximize profits.26
Meanwhile, politicians-empowered by control rights-seldom pursue objectives
that maximize efficiency of the firm. Political intervention through overemployment,
excess wages, costly investments in unproductive ventures, unenforceable contracts (i.e.,
bribes) to get around inefficiencies are the typical inefficiencies plaguing a public firm
[See Section 1.2.7].
One path to efficient ownership is to hand over both control and cash flow rights
over the firm to the manager. Control rights would have to be transferred to the manager
through a legal reform.27 This reform would ideally entitle a private entity the control
rights over public assets and would give mandate to the court of law to enforce them. The
principal form of this reallocation is called corporatization (or commercialization).
Following corporatization, efficient ownership demands that cash flow rights be allocated
from the Treasury. This transfer, known as privatization, can take a variety of forms, but
usually involves either a sale or a subsidized hand-over of cash flow rights to the
managers as well as other investors who share control rights with them. 28 Privatization
brings the manager a legal, secure, and transferable cash flow claim. Armed with both
25 Op cit, footnote 22, Boycko et al.
26 Nellis, John, Contract Plans and Public Enterprise Performance, World Bank Staff
Working Paper No 118, 1988.
27 Op cit, footnote 22, Boycko et al.
28 Ibid
control and cash flow rights, the manager is in the best position to maximize the profits of
his enterprise.
In practice, however, very few developing countries have reformed their electric
utilities, or for that matter, any public infrastructure, to the extent described above. Many
governments stop at corporatization and hesitate to go beyond. Lack of political will,
weak institutional and regulatory arrangements, and macroeconomic instability are some
of the frequently cited reasons for not going beyond the transfer of control rights.
Depending on the degree of private-sector participation, however, four basic
options for institutional reform exist for governments, public sector agencies, and private
groups to assume responsibility for different aspects of service provision [See also Figure
6g in Appendix]. These options are briefly discussed next.
1.3.2 Options for Institutional Reform
The following options represent different allocations of ownership, financing, and
operation and maintenance responsibilities, and also of risk between government and the
private sector.2 Each option requires three broad actions: applying commercial principles
to infrastructure operations, encouraging competition from appropriately regulated
private sector providers, and-increasing the involvement of users and other stakeholders
in planning, providing, and monitoring infrastructure services.30
1.3.2.1 Option A: Public Ownership and Public Operation
In many power infrastructures of developing countries, the most common vehicle
for ownership and operation is a public entity-a parastatal, public enterprise, public
authority, or governmental department--owned and controlled by the central, regional, or
local government.31 The delivery of services are efficiently carried out when these public
entities run on commercial lines, freed from government budget and civil service
constraints and subject to normal commercial codes and regulations. Competition from
private firms also pressures public providers to improve their performance.
29 The World Bank, World Development Report 1994: Infrastructure for Development,
1994.
30 Ibid.
1.3.2.2 Option B: Public Ownership and Private Operation
Through concessions or leases, the public sector can delegate the operation of
infrastructure facilities (along with the commercial risk) and the responsibility for new
investment to the private sector.32 For example, a part of the national power transmission
system may be concessioned to a private monopoly for a period of 75 years. Leases and
concessions permit private sector management and financing without the dismantling of
existing organizations or the immediate crafting of an entirely new regulatory framework.
1.3.2.3 Option C: Private Ownership and Private Operation
Private (including cooperative) ownership and operation are most attractive to the
private sector when there is high potential for securing revenues from user charges and
when commercial and political risk are low. This option is likely to apply most readily in
activities that lend themselves to competition, such as power generation, and more
recently, transmission and distribution. We will discuss in detail different structural,
competitive, and regulatory frameworks of based on this option in next chapter.
1.3.2.4 Community and User Provision
For municipal and local services, user provision or community self-help
arrangements that provide smaller-scale infrastructure-such as isolated microhydro
plants--can provide effective and affordable service in many areas, when those
contribute to the costs are the primary beneficiaries.33 Community self-help schemes must
be selected, designed, and implemented locally--not imposed from outside. They may
also offer the only feasible approach in informal periurban settlements and rural areas
until the more informal supply systems expand their networks sufficiently.
1.4 Summary
We addressed three issues related to the idea of power utility restructuring: First,
we identified financial, managerial, and institutional problems rooted in most state-owned
electric utilities. Second, we borrowed economic principles of property rights and
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid
33 Ibid.
ownership structure to explain and to possibly rectify these problems. And third, guided
by these economic tenets, we cited four broad institutional alternatives. Our discussion
from here onwards will assume Option C as our choice for institutional reforms. The
rationale for this choice is that a substantial number of developing countries including
Chile, Argentina, and Malaysia have successfully applied the above economic principles
to reform their electric utilities. The experiences from these reforms we hope would
directly feed into reform strategies of other aspiring governments.
2. MODELS FOR STRUCTURE, COMPETITION, REGULATION,
AND THEIR INTERACTIONS
The problems of dwindling investment capital, financial mismanagement;
inappropriate investment policies; operational, institutional, and environmental
deficiencies discussed above have forced many developing nations scrambling to search
for solutions. Privatization-the transfer of ownership of state-owned assets to the private
sector-has arguably been the most sought-after recipe by willing policy makers in
developing countries since it swept Chile, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom in the
1980s. At least 300 infrastructure privatizations have been undertaken since 1989-
mostly in Latin America, East Asia, and selected OECD economies.' Whether this
privatization wave will lead to lasting welfare gains or is just part of a historical cycle of
privatization and nationalization is not yet clear. The answer will largely depend on
whether governments can balance regulation with competition best suited to maximize
net welfare gains. An overarching issue that must be identified up front, however, is that
of political willingness: In the name of economic nationalism, the developing country
government has strong interests in controlling the destiny of an industry so central to the
economic infrastructure. This concern lay behind many electricity nationalizations that
occurred this century. This chapter will attempt to gather evidence to illustrate the
possibility of having considerable level of private ownership without losing government
oversight of the rules of the game in the electric utility.
'Klein, Michael and Roger, Neil, Back to the Future: The Potential in Infrastructure
Privatization, Private Sector Notes, Public Policy for the Private Sector, Financial Sector
Development, The World Bank, November, 1994.
2.1 Issues
A policy maker considering privatization of the country's government-owned and
operated electricity supply industry needs to address five fundamental issues: 2
* Should the electric utility, or segments of it, be privatized at all?
* What should be the structure of the privatized industry?
* Where and how should there be competition?
* How should the privatized electricity sector be regulated?
* What method or process of privatization should be used?
The first question, should there be privatization, is tied to the distinctive economic
needs and political realities of the country concerned. As already discussed, several
factors such as huge investment capital, poor financial performance through misplaced
pricing policies, operational, managerial, institutional, and environmental issues are
generally the chief motivations for inviting private participation at varying degrees. This
issue, however, cannot be addressed in meaningful detail for any country without looking
into the specifics of that country. Moreover, passing a judgment on whether a particular
country's electricity provision, or part of it, should be privatized lies well beyond the
purview of this thesis. We will, however, explore specific policy reasons for privatization
in Chapter 3.
Similarly, the last question, how should privatization be implemented, demands
in-depth analysis of constitutional, institutional, and regulatory procedures to be
satisfactorily tackled. Again, we leave this issue here with the hope that it will be more
competently reviewed somewhere else. We will deal with the remaining three questions
by highlighting the characteristics of four structural models of electricity provision and
then identify the roles of competition and regulation in each of these models.
Since most of the findings in this chapter are based on privatization experiences of
UK, USA, and Europe it would be appropriate to define some electric utility terms that
are understood differently in these countries and also to briefly review the physical
characteristics of the electric power system.
2 Tenenbaum, Bernard; Lock, Reinier and Barker, Jim, Electricity privatization:
Structural, competitive and regulatory options, Energy Policy, December 1992.
2.1.1 Terminology
In the USA, distribution refers to the sale of two bundled services to retail
customers by a vertically or non-vertically integrated company.3 The services are
electricity supply and electricity transportation over high and low voltage lines. In the
UK, however, distribution has a narrower meaning. It refers to unbundled transmission of
electricity over distribution lines (i.e., lines with voltage of 132 kV or lower). The
companies that perform this function in England and Wales are called regional electricity
companies (RECs). The RECs also offer an unbundled supply service. This refers to the
acquisition and sale of electricity on an unbundled basis (i.e., without the transportation
or wires charge) to retail or end-user customers. In Britain, RECs do not have an
exclusive franchise on the supply business within their territories. Other RECs, brokers or
generators can compete to sell electricity to a growing number of customers in the service
area of any REC. Thus, in Britain, when someone refers to a supplier, they mean any
entity that sells to retail customers. The same term has a different meaning in the USA. A
supplier in the USA usually means an integrated or non-integrated company that sells
electricity in the wholesale market. Outside the USA, wholesale competition is usually
described as competition in generation. Retail competition, in the USA, is defined as
competition to sell electricity to industrial, commercial and residential end-use customers.
Outside USA, this is known as franchise or supply competition. In the USA wheeling, or
the unbundled transportation of electricity over high and low voltage lines is typically
categorized into 2 groups: retail and wholesale. Outside the USA, wholesale wheeling is
usually described as wheeling or transmission for generators.
2.1.2 Technology
That the only function of the high voltage grid is to transmit electricity is too
simplistic an assumption. The interconnected grid is an important element in maintaining
the overall reliability of the whole electric supply system.4 Within an interconnected grid,
the actions of a single generator or the failure of a single transmission line can cause the
SIbid.
4 Fox-Penner, Peter, Electric Power Transmission and Wheeling, Edison Electric
Institute, Washington, DC 1990.
electrical collapse of the entire grid. To prevent this from happening, one or more entities
must be responsible for maintaining the stability of the interconnected system. For the
purpose of this discussion, we will assume that it is a single entity and refer to it as the
system dispatching agency. This agency has three essential responsibilities: First, it needs
to schedule generation plants minute by minute to ensure that, at any time, demand is
balanced by supply since electricity cannot be stored in bulk. Second, it needs to have a
ready contingency plan that can be instantly implemented in case of a supply failure.
Finally, it must develop and coordinate generation and transmission maintenance
schedules. In most existing electricity systems, the owner of the transmission grid is also
the system dispatch agency. Thus, a single entity performs all three functions-
transmission, reliability and dispatch. This is the prevailing mode in developing countries
and most of the industrial countries. However, there are alternative approaches. For
example, utilities in the mid-Atlantic and north-east regions of the USA have ceded
central dispatch and, to some degree, reliability to a higher level cooperative organization
known as a power pool.5
The point to be driven home here is that regardless of which industry structure is
selected, the grid cannot operate successfully unless the structural model accommodates
the above three functions.
2.2 Structure
In simplified terms, there are four basic models of industry structure, each with
several variations. The models differ by how much restructuring is required. In the
subsequent chapter, we use six models of industry structure examine the impact of
various degrees of vertical deintegration on the performance of energy service provision.
While it is perfectly reasonable to discuss restructuring in the context of already
privatized entities, we will look into restructuring as a gateway to privatization.
* The term power pool is used in the USA to describe a broad spectrum of cooperative
arrangements among independently owned utilities. Op cit, footnote 2, Tenenbaum et al.
Model 1
This model is the traditional industry structure prevailing in the USA.6 It consists
of one or more vertically integrated, privately owned electricity companies, usually
serving well defined regional service territories. Each company owns its own generation,
transmission and distribution facilities. If this model were chosen in developing countries,
a government monopoly will be replaced with one or more private monopolies. Stated
differently, there is privatization without competition. Of the four models, this is the
easiest to implement because it keeps the existing structure intact. On the contrary, the
long-run rewards from this arrangement may be very limited.
Model 2
This model continues the traditional structure with competitive procurement of
generation.7 Each company owns all of the distribution and transmission facilities in its
service territory, but only some or none, of the generation plants needed to serve its retail
or end-use customers. Such a structure could develop if all state owned generating plants
that existed at the time of privatization were transferred to new private companies. Then
after this initial transfer is made, some or all new plants are built and operated by separate
independent generating companies controlled by other domestic and/or foreign investors.
The companies that owned the transmission and distribution facilities can be given the
option of meeting incremental demand by self-construction or long-term power purchases
from independent suppliers.8 This model creates a mixed regulatory system: deregulation
of new generation with continued regulation (or government ownership) of transmission
and distribution.
6 Ibid.
7Ibid.
8 In India and Korea, it appears that the government will retain ownership of existing
plants while seeking private independent investors to build, own and operate (BOO) new
generating plants. This is a form of incremental or partial privatization. See Delegation
from India coming to US seeking developers for 22,558 MW, Electric Utility Week, May
17, 1992 and South Korea to invite foreign firms to bid on two 500 MW coal plants,
Electric Utility Week, March 16, 1992.
Model 3
This model expands on the second model by introducing common or contract
carriage whereby each private or government enterprise that owns high voltage
transmission lines is now required to provide firm and non-firm transmission service to
other wholesale electricity buyers and sellers.' Model 3 seems to be preferred by
government authorities who want to go beyond competitive procurement of new
generation but who are constrained, for political or other reasons, to working within an
existing industry structure that remains unchanged. What changes is that those who own
transmission have a new obligation: they must provide transmission service to possible
competitors at reasonable prices and on reasonable terms. In effect, transmission access is
grafted on to an existing vertical industry structure.
Model 4
The last model is the new British (England and Wales) and, more recently, the
Argentinean model."' It requires complete vertical separation of generation, transmission
and distribution. The entire high voltage transmission grid is owned by a new separate
company that has a common carrier obligation to all buyers and sellers of electricity and
which also provides the system dispatch system, that is, determining which generating
units should produce electricity at any given moment. The distribution companies provide
unbundled transmission at distribution voltages and sell electricity to wholesale and retail
customers within and outside their traditional service areas. Like the transmission
company, the distribution companies have common carrier obligation on their wires
services.
By referring to this model as the British model does not imply that the model will
work only if implemented exactly as designed by the British in their 1990 privatization."
9 A common carrier is usually defined to be an entity that is required to transmit
electricity for buyers and sellers on a non-discriminatory basis and, if necessary, to
construct additional capacity if the existing capacity is inadequate to meet all requests.
See Bonbright, John; Daneilson, Albert and Kamerschen, David, Principles ofPublic
Utility Rates, Public Utilities Report, Arlington, VA, 1988.
'0 The British model refers to the structure adopted in England and Wales, Op Cit,
footnote 2, Tenebaum et al.
" Ibid.
The basic vertically deintegrated structure that now exists in England and Wales could be
adopted elsewhere without three features that were incorporated in the British
privatization: retail competition, up to 15% equity stakes in generating stations by
distributing companies, and a spot market mechanism for clearing up energy and capacity
transactions. 12
2.3 Competition
Two issues that arise when competition is contemplated are: How deep should
competition cut and, once this is decided, how should it be introduced?"
It is generally agreed that at least the generation function is potentially
competitive and that the transmission and distribution functions are, in most
circumstances, natural monopolies."' In most countries the distribution company is
granted a franchise service territory with a more or less exclusive monopoly right and
accompanying obligation to provide end-use customers the service they need."
Generally, the exclusive right to serve is maintained by the utilities' monopoly control
over transmission facilities. The key to significant competition on most systems comes
down to who has access, or the right to use, the utilities' transmission system on
reasonable terms and conditions. Most privatizing governments will have two
fundamental options.'6 These are described next.
2.3.1 Wholesale/non-franchise access
The first option would be to limit competition to the non-franchise level, typically
the wholesale level, by allowing only generators and distribution utilities access to the
transmission grid in order to give the latter increased options as to power supply." As the
high voltage transmission grid has grown in the USA, some level of competition in these
markets has developed even without major government intervention to guarantee access
12 Ibid
13 Ibid.
14 Schmalensee, Richard, The Control ofMonopolies, DC, Heath, Lexington, VA, 1979.
5 Op Cit, footnote 2, Tenenbaum et al.16 Ibid.
'7 Ibid
for these entities to transmission service. This competition has been facilitated by a
significant level of voluntary access or wheeling granted by utilities, especially as to each
other's surplus capacity, and to the development of independent power sector under
federal regulatory guarantees that guarantee some market, albeit often localized, for their
power. The issue of mandatory wholesale access has proved highly controversial in both
the European Community and the United States.'" Those supporting the mandatory
wholesale access argue that it is the fundamental prerequisite to a fully competitive
generation market. Those who oppose it, usually transmission owning utilities, have
argued that that the only way to run an electric power system is an integrated monopoly.
They contend that open access and competition threaten both the technical reliability of
utility systems and their long-term economic efficiency and assurance of supply.
2.3.2 Retail or franchise access to end-use customers
The yet more controversial and difficult issue is whether the competing
generators should also have transmission access to end-use (retail) customers."' From the
supplier's perspective, this implies providing customers transmission access to other
suppliers and hence bypass the previous exclusive supply monopoly. This possibility
raises serious system reliability and long-term efficiency concerns. Moreover, that a right
of end-use customers to leave their systems at will could lead to serious stranded
investment problems that may, in turn, raise prices for remaining customers and may
even threaten the financial viability of distribution monopoly.20 The stranded investment
concern is particularly acute for vertically integrated systems that have built capital
intensive, long gestation facilities to meet the expected load or demand of franchise
customers on a long-term basis. In the US, many distribution companies heavily depend
on long-term power contracts with independent power producers and, thus, fear that retail
access will undermine the current franchise system.
These valid concerns are, however, not intractable. The stranded investment
dilemma can be overcome by imposing notice of direct compensation requirements on
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
end-use (or wholesale distribution) customers leaving the franchise system, and on those,
having left, wishing to return to the system for assured service. 2' These requirements
would be related to the utility planning horizons for additional capacity investments and
would be designed to protect the utility from stranded investment losses and to protect
remaining customers from returning customers' threatening adequacy of service.22
Free-rider problem is another potential concern that needs to be addressed when
retail access is being considered. For example, non-franchise customers wheeling power
from a franchise grid would be receiving reliability benefits at the expense of franchise
customers if they are not required to procure sufficient generating capacity. 23
At least three models have emerged for accommodating end-use or retail access:
The first model would permit access for end-users of a certain minimum size alone.24 The
second model would permit access for new customers or for incremental loads only, that
is, new demand, but would not permit customers access to switch suppliers for existing
loads.25 The third model would permit customers to select whether they preferred to be
served on a monopoly franchise, assured supply basis or to shop on the competitive bulk
power markets for their own supply. Such a system could permit customers to move from
one to the other regime with reasonable notice.26
2.3.3 A Phased Strategy
Against this backdrop of restructuring challenges, a gradualist approach worth
pursuing would be for privatizing governments to limit competition, at least in the early
years of privatization, to the generation level (i.e., non-franchise access) and not enter the
20 Ibid
21 In the USA, this is sometimes called the prodigal son problem, Ibid.
22 Tenebaum et al. proposed these safeguards to the Commission of the European
Communities. The authors asserted that appropriate notice provisions should preserve the
franchise distribution monopoly for those customers which preferred service; and that
end-use competition and the franchise distribution monopoly could exist.
23 This is an example of a network externality, Ibid.24 Ibid.
25 In the USA, a form of access for new end-use customers is allowed in Georgia. See
Georgia Territorial Electric Service Act. Ga. L. 1973.
26 Op Cit, footnote 2, Tenebaum et al.
arena of end-use level competition.27 That should make management of the economic and
technical challenges and risks, and of political opposition to the privatization,
immeasurably easier. We, therefore, examine two principal options for competitive
generation that exist in the UK and the New England Power Pool (NEPOOL) in the
United States.
2.3.4 Mechanism for Competition in Generation
In three of the four industry structure models, the restructuring is designed to
introduce competition in generation. If one of these three models is selected, it is still
necessary to decide how the competition will occur. The two principal options are the
competitive mechanisms that exist in the UK and the New England Power Pool
(NEPOOL) in the United States.28 The question then is which competitive mechanism
will lead to the greatest operating and investment efficiencies.
In the UK, the competitive mechanism is a half-hourly spot market for capacity
and energy backed up by a variety of hedging contracts. 29 The National Grid Company
(NGC) dispatches generating units on the basis of price offers received for individual
generating units. The grid company's dispatchers do not know the variable operating
costs of individual generatirig units. Instead, they attempt to create an optimal pattern of
dispatch in every half-hour from the quantities of power that the separate generating
companies are willing to offer at specified prices. The price received by generators
known as the pool input price (PIP) has two principal components: a spot energy price
and a capacity element. The spot energy price is the price of the highest bid accepted by
NGC in each half-hour. All generators that are scheduled to run receive this single price.
The capacity component compensates generators for making their unit available even if
the unit is not scheduled to run.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Strictly speaking, the UK market is a forward market because sellers are committing to
sell their electricity at specified prices for different half-hour periods on the following
day. In contrast, a true spot market is characterized by immediate delivery of the product.
See Hunt, Sally and Shuttleworth, Graham, Forward, Option and Spot Markets in the UK
Power Pool, National Economic Research Associates, London, 1991.
A different competitive mechanism is used in the New England region of the
USA.30 Within New England, more than 90 individual utilities are members of a
cooperative organization known as the New England Power Pool. Each NEPOOL
member is obligated to install or to purchase generating capacity which is sufficient to
meet the peak demand of its retail and firm contractual customers plus additional reserves
to protect against emergencies. Once this capacity or firm energy obligation is met, the
member provides the pool dispatch center with information that can be used to calculate
variable operating cost at different loading levels for each of its generating units. With
this information, the pool dispatches all units to minimize the hour to hour cost of
producing electricity for the entire region. The pool also establishes maintenance
schedules for all generating units to minimize the region's total production cost.
2.3.5 Assessing performance
The relative performance of the NEPOOL and British approaches to competition
must be assessed in several dimensions:3'
* Is there adequate investment in new capacity?
* Is it the right kind of capacity?
* Is generation dispatched on a least cost basis throughout the year?
While no definite answers exist since both the market mechanisms are in
transition, preliminary observations, however, can be made at this point. Neither the
NEPOOL nor the British system seem to have any problems in attracting capital for new
generating capacity. The technology of choice for generation capacity expansion in both
these countries appear to be combined cycle gas turbines (CCGTs). These turbines are
economic at smaller sizes, can be built in a shorter time than coal fired units, and provide
environmental advantages relative to coal. Whether this technology turns out to be the
correct economic choice for both systems can only be known with the passage of time.32
What drives investment decisions in the two mechanisms? In the UK, it was
originally anticipated that the capacity component of the spot market would influence
30 ECC Inc. Proceedings of Power Pooling Conference, Fairfax, VA, 1988.
31 Op Cit, footnote 2, Tenebaum et al.
such decisions. All new generators, however, obtain most of their revenues from hedging
contracts-independent of the pool--and not the loss of load probability (LOLP)
component of the pool input price.33 It has been estimated that about 95% of the
electricity generation is sold at contract rather than spot prices.34 If the capacity
component were to be removed from the spot market pricing formula, the purpose of the
pool would be limited to static efficiency-achieving a daily merit order dispatch. The
investment decisions that determine long-term efficiency would be driven by the hedging
contracts. This change would make the British and NEPOOL competitive mechanisms
similar, even though the industry structures remain distinct.3
The differences between the two competitive mechanisms are more significant
when we deal with short-term cost minimization.36 Both systems strive for a least cost
pattern of dispatch. The NEPOOL system dispatches on marginal cost while the British
dispatches on bid prices. While it seems reasonably certain that NEPOOL is achieving a
least cost pattern of dispatch the evidence from the British system is not so clear. The
prices in the British spot market may diverge from marginal cost because most generators
only derive a small share of their total revenue from the pool. This may create incentives
for gaming. An actual study--comparing this method of dispatch with that which would
have occurred if the merit order dispatch had been based on marginal costs-is in want.
2.4 Regulatory Options
Each of the industry structure models we have described above contains a mix of
competitive and monopoly characteristics. Governments--developing and industrialized
alike-have traditionally checked monopoly rents sought by public and private
enterprises. Ideally, regulation should put pressure on the monopolist so that it performs
32 Ibid.
33 Dr. Dieter Helm's testimony in House of Commons, Energy Committee, Consequences
of Electricity Privatization, Vol I, HMSO, London, Feb. 1992.
34 Ibid.
35 Op Cit, footnote 2, Tenebaum et al.36 Ibid.
in price, profit, output and efficiency as if it were in a competitive environment.37 The
two principal regulatory approaches are cost-of-service or rate of return regulation and
incentive regulation."3
2.4.1 Cost-of-service-regulation
The cost-of-service regulation model has dominated utility ratemaking in the US
for most of this century.3 9 In this method, the regulatory agency sets the company's
overall revenue requirements equal to its total costs. Total costs are comprised of
operating expenses, capital costs and an allowed rate of return on some measure of
invested capital. 40 Costs may be keyed to historic costs or estimates of future costs. Once
an overall cost or revenue level is set, it is then allocated among different customer
groups. Cost-of-service regulation closely resembles civil court cases that take place in
the United States.4' Typically, a contested rate will include witnesses for the company and
opposing parties, filed testimonies, cross-examination by lawyers, appeals, etc. Cost-of-
service regulation has two main drawbacks: 42 First, this type of regulation is capable of
ensuring that prices are determined by historical costs, but it is less capable of ensuring
that costs are at an efficient level. Second, cost-of-service regulation does not create good
incentives for innovation and service flexibility, as is necessary to deliver the greatest
possible satisfaction to customers. Some limited incentives, however, do exist.43 For
example, rates are not automatically adjusted to reflect cost changes. There can be a
regulatory lag of months or years before a utility is allowed or ordered to change its rates.
During this lag period, utility managers have an incentive to be efficient to minimize
" Breyer, Stephen, Regulation and its Reform, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
MA, 1982.
38 Yardstick competition and franchise bidding are two other control techniques that are
often discussed but not widely used: op cit, footnote 14, Schmalensee.
39 Jaffe, Adam B., Kalt, Joseph P., An Economic Analysis of Electricity Industry
Restructuring in New England, The Economics Resource Group, Inc., Cambridge, MA,
April, 1995.
40 Op cit, footnote 2, Tenebaum et al.
41 Ibid.
42 Op cit, footnote 38, Adam et al.
43 Op cit, footnote 2, Tenebaum et al.
losses if costs are rising or to maximize profits when costs are falling. Disincentives to
build new plants under the cost of service regulation are equally possible. Second, there is
no guarantee that a utility will be allowed to recover all of its cost. There is always a risk
that a regulatory commission will find a particular operating or capital expense to be
inappropriate and not allow the utility to recover the cost in its rates."4
These two features of cost-of-service regulation-regulatory lag and regulatory
disallowances-provide, at best, weak and non-systematic efficiency incentives.
Consequently, most observers would concur that the current US regulatory system was
not designed to encourage utilities to control costs. 45
2.4.2 Incentive Regulation
The USA has experimented with this type of regulation as a supplement to, rather
than as a replacement for, cost of service regulation. In these cases, the incentive
mechanisms are keyed to individual cost components or physical targets such as the
availability levels of one or more generating plants. A recent empirical assessment
suggests that these partial incentive mechanisms have not been very effective.46
The British system adopted a more far-reaching form of incentive regulation-the
price cap regulation--with the RPI-X formula. The formula allows a company to raise its
rates on regulated services from a base level by the change in the retail price index (an
index not tied to the company's own costs) minus an X-factor targeted to the expected net
effect of productivity increases, demand growth and the capital expenditures.47 Within the
British electricity industry, the RPI-X formula is being applied to the National Grid
Company (NGC) and the transportation, captive and overall power sales of the
44 A discussion of new nuclear power plants built in the US during the 80s can be found
in Roger Naill and William C. Dudley in IPP leveragedfinancing, unfair advantage?,
Public Utilities Fortnightly, Jan. 15, 1992.
45 Joskow, Paul and Schmalensee, Richard, Incentive regulation for electric utilities, Yale
Journal of Regulation, Vol 4, No 1, 1986.
46 Berg, Sanford V. and Jeong, Jinook, An evaluation of incentive regulation for electric
utilities, Journal of Regulatory of Economics, Vol 3, 1991.
47 Littlechild, S. and Beesley, M., The regulation ofprivatized monopolies in the United
Kingdom, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol 20, No 3.
distribution companies. In theory, the British system regulates price while the American
system regulates profits.48 In fact, the British program provides for something akin to a
cost-of-service review every five years. The price produced by this review becomes the
new base level to which the RPI-X applied. It is, therefore, probably more accurate to
think of the UK approach as a rate of return regulation with an institutionalized five-year
regulatory lag between cost of service reviews.
Most economists agree that the UK price-cap formula should produce better
incentives for a regulated company to operate efficiently for the following reason: The
company gets to keep five years of profits if it is efficient, while it loses money if it is
not.49 Potential shortcomings of this approach, however, do exist. First, will the British
regulator be able to resist the temptation to make downward price adjustments if
companies start earning higher than expected profits?5o Second, will the regulated
companies try to increase profits by reducing quality of service?51 And third, will the
formula provide sufficient incentives to encourage capital investments?
2.4.3 Conduct regulation
Cost of service and price cap regulation are examples of performance regulation.
Performance regulation tries to influence the actions and decisions of the regulated
company through specified targets rather than through direct control of the company's
behavior.52 Conduct regulation attempts at precisely the latter type of control. Conduct
regulation, in essence, represents a failure of regulation. 3 A regulator has to resort to
regulating conduct when a company needs to be forced to do what it does not want to do.
48 Op cit, footnote 2, Tenebaum et al.
49 Ibid.
50 When 1991-92 profit figures were issued for the RECs, Professor Littlechild was
quoted as saying that the companies 'have certainly made large profits' and that he could
'well understand' customers' concerns about this: Power in Europe, June 18, 1992.
51 A major difference between cost of service and price cap regulation is that under cost of
service regulation the regulator 'must police costs, but not quality'. Under price cap
regulation, the regulator must police quality, but not cost. See Fox-Penner, Peter, Quality
maintenance andprice-cap regulation, Charles River Associates, Boston, MA, mimeo,
June, 1992.
52 Op cit, footnote 2, Tenebaum et al.
Conduct regulation is the backstop when the underlying industry structure or pricing
regime fail to give the regulated company economic incentives to perform as the
regulator thinks it should. In the US, conduct regulation has taken two principal forms.
The first type--described as integrated resource planning (IRP)--allows the regulatory
agency to be involved in the company's resource planning and selection process; parallel
consideration of demand-side and supply-side options; explicit consideration of
environmental costs; and greater public participation in the development of resource
plans. 54 The second type--spurred by the introduction of competition-includes reviews
of competitive procurements for new generating capacity based on given regulatory
guidelines.
The UK has also exhibited signs of growing conduct regulation in its power
industry. For example, in December 1991, Professor Littlechild, the chief regulator of the
electricity industry in England and Wales, cautioned the two major generating companies
against manipulation of the spot market price."
The reality of conduct regulation, however, is that it may succeed in stopping one
action to find that the regulated company is able to accomplish the same outcome using a
variant of the prohibited behavior that had not been anticipated by the regulator. An
electric industry thus has not achieved self-sustaining competition if the regulator finds
himself chasing after conduct. It, therefore, appears that the better long-range solution is
to get the structure and pricing right to minimize the need for conduct regulation.
2.5 The Interaction among Structure, Competition, and Regulation
So far, we have examined models for industry structure, competition, and
regulation all in isolation. Reality, however, demands an inquiry into the feasibility of
different possible combinations of all of the three elements. We go back to the industry
structure models described in Section 2.2 and incorporate the other two factors.
" Ibid.
54 Baraket, Howard and Chamberlin, Moving toward integrated resource planning:
Understanding the theory and practice ifleast-cost and demand-side management,
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), EM-5065, February, 1987.
5s Op cit, footnote 2, Tenebaum et al.
2.5.1 Industry Model 1
This model is one of the most difficult ones to restructure to allow for
competition. As explained in Section 2.2, the vertically integrated structure is already
privatized here. If the government mandates further restructuring the private property-
rights holder will expect reasonable compensation."6 Without this compensation, the
government may find it difficult take privatization beyond what had been envisioned as a
temporary industry structure.
Cost-of-service regulation is the usual mode for regulating the non-competitive
industry structure.57 This structure-competition-regulation combination allows for very
few incentives for the enterprise to be efficient.58 Given the industry structure, one
possible remedy would be to introduce yardstick competition among regional
monopolies--wherever feasible--under an incentive-based regulation regime.59
2.5.2 Industry Model 2
This structure allows for incremental competition in generation and it also appears
to be the preferred approach for developing country governments that wish to experiment
with privatization in a limited way. Typically, the government will maintain its monopoly
over the existing integrated system while offering domestic and foreign investors the
opportunity to build, own and operate new generating plants."6
The US-based PURPA model has this industry structure. A major concern often
put forward is that the transaction costs-the costs of negotiating and enforcing
56 Ibid
57 Ibid.
58 One study found that the cost/kWh of nuclear plants started in the same year by
different US utilities with this structure sometimes varied by a factor of six. See Energy
Information Administration, An analysis of nuclear power plant construction costs,
Washington, DC, 1986.
59 In yardstick competition, a criteria is chosen for comparison. This could be either the
performance of others in the same industry or an external target or standard. Allowed
revenues are then correlated to how well the firm performs in comparison to the selected
criteria. See Cardell, Judith, Utility regulation, draft, Cambridge, MA 02139.
60 Op cit, footnote 2, Tenebaum et al.
contracts-involved in assuring IPPs to perform well is so great that the benefits of
vertical deintegration are nullified.61 Proponents of this argument are, therefore, for single
ownership of generation, transmission, and distribution. While economic theory gives no
definitive answer nor has there been any empirical study that directly addresses this
question for the electricity industry, three issues are worth considering. First, it is
misleading to compare a vertically integrated structure with a vertically deintegrated
structure without factoring in regulation.62 A realistic assessment requires comparing a
vertically integrated structure that is regulated and protected from competition with a
vertically deintegrated structure in which the generation function is competitive and
loosely regulated. Savings in transaction costs that result from integrating generation,
transmission, and distribution in a single company must be reduced by the inefficiencies
likely to be induced by regulation and the absence of competition.
Second, the relevant comparison is not complete vertical integration versus
complete vertical deintegration either.63 The experience to date shows that most countries
that move to a vertically deintegrated structures generally choose to retain some part of
the generating capacity under the ownership of the company that has the transmission and
distribution functions. This mixed structure may provide some insurance to protect
against opportunistic behavior by IPPs. It may also pressure the state-owned company to
perform, at least, as well as the privately-owned company.
Third, negotiating a contract to purchase the output of an independent power
producer is a complicated exercise that involves anticipating many contingencies.64 These
contingencies would not have occurred had there been a single vertically integrated
company. Since state-owned enterprises probably have little experience with long-term
purchase contracts, lending agencies such as the World Bank should encourage
61 This concept originated in a classic article by Ronald Coase, The nature ofthe firm,
Economica, Vol 4, 1937.
62 Op Cit, footnote 2, Tenebaum et al.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
borrowing countries to use independent buying agents with proven track records in
successfully procuring new generating capacity.6
2.5.3 Industry Model 3
The third type of industry structure combines a core group of integrated
monopolies in transmission and generation with competitive procurement of new
generation and mandated common or contract carriage for, at least, all buyers and sellers
in the wholesale market. 66 With common or contract carriage, buyers can now choose
from among short- and long-term power suppliers in a larger geographic area.
Model 3 seems to be of most interest to large countries or regional groupings of
several countries.67 While short-term transactions between neighboring companies or
countries are currently taking place wherever physical interconnections exist, guaranteed
transmission access across a company's network would be a prerequisite to any long-term
long-distant sales. International and intra-national sales do differ however, at least, in one
respect: subsidies.68 In a multicountry region, each country is likely to provide a different
level of subsidy to its electricity industry. A supplier with less subsidy will naturally
oppose competition with that receiving more subsidy. In Europe, this is known as the
harmonization problem.
Model 3 may be adopted in the USA and Europe over the next several years with
one significant difference. The proposed European version would provide access to large
industrial customers to purchase from non-contiguous electricity suppliers. In the US
legislation, retail access is forbidden."
65 Three US utilities that have developed sophisticated and successful procurement
systems are Virginia Power, Florida Power and Light and the New England Electric
System, op cit, footnote 2, Tenebaum et al.66 Ibid
67 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
69 Another possible difference relates to the extent of the transmission obligation. The
European proposal requires third-party access to the extent there is capacity available
while US FERC regulation requires the transmission owner to construct new capacity if
unable to provide service from existing facilities. Op cit, footnote 2, Tenebaum et al.
We now go back to the earlier premise that Model 3 survives on common contract
or carriage and examine its regulatory ramifications.
One practical difficulty with this structural model is that getting transmission
owners to provide transmission service to each other when they may have an economic
incentive not to do so. This implies that the regulator will need to force compliance.7"
This requires expanding the regulator's job from regulating profits to regulating conduct
which, in turn, may demand thorough technical competence from the regulator to make a
correct assessment. If this is expecting too much from the regulator then there has to
some way of checking the transmission owner's non-competitive behavior.
Some industry groups in the US have responded to this dilemma by suggesting a
variant of model 3 that requires a much smaller role for the regulator. This variant-
usually referred to as regional or voluntary transmission agreement-combines continued
separate ownership of high voltage transmission facilities with explicit contractual
commitments to provide user rights to others." It attempts to achieve transmission access
through a single multiparty agreement rather than a multitude of individual transmission
tariffs. The agreement is self-policing and the regulator's role is largely that of an arbiter.
Limited version of regional transmission agreements exist in the US in Georgia and
Indiana.7 2
An alternative to such regional transmission agreements is a competitive joint
venture.73 All transmission facilities in a regional grid would be owned by a separate
company and each owner-user would own shares in the company. Each owner would get
the right to use an amount of transmission capacity proportional to its ownership
70 This assumes that the regulator has the incentive to pursue compliance. This, according
to the authors, is not a plausible assumption if the regulator represents a constituency that
would be hurt by compliance, op cit, footnote 2, Tenebaum et al.
71 National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, Special report: meeting of
transmission access groups, Power Supply Report, Washington, DC, April 1992.
72 Integrated Transmission System Agreement between Georgia Power, Oglethorpe
Power Corporation, the Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia and the City of Dalton,
August 27, 1976 and Transmission and Local Facilities Ownership, Operation and
Maintenance Agreement Between Public Service Company of Indiana Inc and Wabash
Valley Power Association Inc and Indiana Municipal Power Agency, November 5, 1985.
73 Op cit, footnote 2, Tenebaum et al.
interest.74 For example, prior to National Grid Company's (UK) public offering over a
year ago, it was owned by 12 RECs. Their ownership of equity does not give them right
to own or resell specified amounts of transmission capacity. To ensure compliance, the
government owns a 'special' share in the company.
Another regulatory issue associated with third-party access is that of transmission
pricing. Current transmission pricing in the US is based on historical accounting cost.
Furthermore, the price is not differentiated by the distance between the seller and the
buyer. In the new comparable access paradigm, both distance and true usage costs of the
transmission system will have to be recovered since there would be no single owner-user
of the grid. If a contract path for wheeling power is to be negotiated, there is no assurance
that electricity will actually flow through that path." It is, therefore, technically possible
that a transmission user could have used a third party's transmission system at the latter's
expense without his knowing.
A final regulatory issue that warrants an understanding is that of native load
customer protection.76 In the US, native load customers refers to the retail and wholesale
customer to whom the utility has a legal or contractual obligation to supply power to meet
that customer's existing and future demand. Given this definition, the bone of contention
is: 77 How should transmission be priced when there is insufficient capacity to serve the
competing needs of native load and third party transmission customers? As far as native
load protection is concerned, the response is, more or less, straightforward. The
transmission owner should not be forced to sacrifice at all its system reliability to satisfy
someone else's transmission needs. This is only fair because native load customers have
paid for the capital costs of the transmission lines in the rates they have paid over many
74 Ibid.
" According to Ohm's law, current will flow through the path of least electrical resistance
and according to Kirchhoff s law, the sum of currents flowing in to a node is equal to that
flowing out of the node. Combined, these two laws not only defy contract paths but can
also be a serious cause of load congestion in the transmission lines.
76 US Federal Regulatory Commission, Northeast Utilities Service Company, Opinion
364-A, 58 FERC para 61 070, January 29, 1992, and Edison Electric Institute, A proposal
for the appropriated pricing of transmission services, Transmission Issue Monograph, No
4, May 1992.
years.78 This is also efficient because it ensures that the limited transmission capacity is
used for those power sales that produce the greatest benefits. In the US, pricing based on
foregone benefits to the transmission owner is called opportunity cost pricing."79 FERC
has stated its willingness to accept transmission tariffs that include 'legitimate and
verifiable' opportunity costs."s What constitutes a reasonable opportunity cost is a
question that would need to be resolved by regulators, utilities and industry practitioners.
2.5.4 Industry Model 4
As described earlier (see Section 2.2), model 4 involves total separation of
generation from transmission and distribution. We specifically focus on the UK
experience in this section for two reasons: First, it provides us with an operational
prototype of this model. And second, sufficient literature on the British privatization and
restructuring experience does exist to make a reasonable assessment of this model. We
will focus on four particular issues here. A fifth issue--the use of a spot market backed
by hedging contracts as the basic competitive mechanism--was discussed earlier (see
Section 2.3.5).
Concentrated generation sector
Up and till a couple bf years ago, the newly privatized generation sector was
highly concentrated with the two big companies, National Power and PowerGen, owning
nearly 70% of the total generating assets.8' With their current market power and direct
access to retail consumers, not only could they manipulate the spot market, they could
also subsidize their retail and wholesale businesses from the revenues of their generation
business.
The degree of concentration, however, has decreased with new private companies
and IPPs collectively generating more than one-thirds of the total energy today.
77 Op cit, footnote 2, Tenebaum et al.78 Ibid.
79 US Federal Regulatory Commission, Northeast Utilities Service Company, Attachment
B, 57 FERC para 61 340, December 15, 1992.
80so Op cit, footnote 75, Opinion 364-A.
81 Op cit, footnote 2, Tenebaum et al.
Moreover, National Power and PowerGen have also been "told" to sell off some of their
assets voluntarily. 82
The reintegration problem
While new entering IPPs dilute the market power of existing dominant
companies, many of them are actually affiliated with their buyers, the RECs, and are not
truly independent IPPs.83 The RECs rightfully argue that their ownership of equity in the
new generators allows them to reduce the dominance of the two big generators. This
argument, however, ignores other effects. For example, whenever a regulated buyer has
captive customers, it has the incentive to purchase from its unregulated affiliate at a price
that is higher than the market price. Captive customers would end up paying more unless
the regulator can correct this inefficient outcome by enforcing economic purchase license
duties.
End of the captive retail market
By 1998, every customer in Britain down to the smallest residential consumer will
have the right to buy from any supplier in the country." This total freedom to choose
suppliers may influence operating investment and operating decisions in three possible
ways.
The first effect is that of asymmetric obligation on stranded investment. While
RECs' customers will have total freedom to choose other suppliers, the RECs will
continue to have a permanent legal obligation to supply electricity to any customer within
a specified geographic area that has a maximum demand of 10 MW or less.85 In non-
regulated markets, sellers and buyers have no legal obligation to do business with each
other.
This kind of asymmetric obligation on the RECs leads to uncertainty. The
proportion of customers who will continue their allegiance to their old REC depends
partly on the costs of switching to another supplier and partly on the REC's price vis a vis
82 Personal communication with Richard Tabors, thesis co-advisor.
83 Ibid.
" Ibid.
85 Ibid
that of other suppliers.86 If the REC overestimates its demand, it runs the risk of running
losses by paying fixed obligations incurred in hedging contracts.
The second effect relates to the duration of contracts signed between suppliers and
the new non-captive customers."7 The conventional wisdom is that IPPs need long-term
purchase agreements (i.e., 15 years or more) to obtain project financing for new
generating projects. Under the non-captive customer provision since buyers would not
want to sign longer duration contracts, the option of project financing may disappear. The
possible entrants in the generation sector would, therefore, be limited to larger companies
that are capable of financing projects based on their balance sheets.88
A third possible effect of retail access is that because the risks are now transferred
from few RECs to several IPPs-selling to many different customers who sign contracts
of different durations-the need to group the demand of many different customers with
dissimilar demands will raise transaction costs. 89
2.6 Conclusion
Against the backdrop of poor financial, managerial, and operating performances
of developing country electric utilities and their inherent inability to muster sufficient
investment capital, we surveyed various options and models of current industry structure,
competition, and regulation by primarily drawing upon the experiences of the UK and
USA. Private ownership of divested public assets backed by competition-sufficient to
challenge market power-and minimal regulation would be an ideal combination for a
growing electric industry.
If UK's privatization experience offers us any lesson, it is this: Where politically
feasible, the preferred approach would be to put the industry and regulatory structures in
861bid.
87 Ibid.
8 Ibid. While we will explore drawbacks of project financing from a developing country
perspective, it is interesting to note that complete deintegration with retail access,
regardless of a country's developmental stage, will require balance-sheet or corporate
financing to assure a leveled playing field.
89 Ibid.
place prior to privatization. 90 This is what is being carried out in Australia and New
Zealand. If this is politically infeasible, the alternatives is to do what the British did-
restructure and privatize at the same time. However, there are two potential problems
with the British approach: First, once the structure is in place, it is difficult to correct
these mistakes. After new private companies come into existence, they will naturally
oppose any further changes that would hurt their property rights. The reality is that it is
much easier to make changes before privatization than to do so afterwards."9
Second, it may be better to restructure before privatizing from the context of
attracting private investment. With the worldwide movement towards privatization, there
is enormous competition for private capital. It is axiomatic that investors require higher
returns when they perceive more risk. Uncertainty increases risk. If a country wants to get
a reasonable price for a government owned electricity system, it must provide some
certainty about the new rules of the game.92
The next step in our discussion is to appraise the current industrial and ownership
structures of electricity service provision in developing countries and examine their
impacts on service performance. The extent of power system deintegration, i.e., the shift
from Model 1 towards Model 4 of the industry structure, is a reasonable indicator of a
government's willingness to introduce competition among service providers and of its
institutional capacity to regulate or deregulate them.
Similarly, based on the economic principles laid out in the preceding chapter, the
degree of private-sector involvement in energy service provision may serve as a gauge for
the government's commitment to promote private capital in infrastructure development
and to improve upon the existing level of service performance.
Against this background of economic and performance realities and options for
restructuring the electric utilities, we examine in the following chapter whether private-
sector involvement is as important as competition for improving service quality and
90 Ibid
91 Horton, Geoff, Competition and antitrust legislation in the electric power sector,
Seminar on current issues in regulation, World Bank, May 28, 1992.
92 Clements, Phillip J., Valuation issues in lesser developed countries investment
opportunities, Coopers and Lybrand, New York, March, 1992.
operational efficiency of electricity provision. This becomes a crucial distinction when
we observe some governments from industrialized nations continuing to own and operate
electric utilities efficiently while those from developing countries are anxious to privatize
public monopolies without giving much thought to the overarching long-term goals and
decisions.
3. OWNERSHIP VS. MULTIPLICITY: DOES OWNERSHIP
MATTER?
Up to this point, we have expanded our basic tenet, that private ownership is
important, to include crucial elements like structure, competition, and regulation to
facilitate an economically efficient provision of electricity. This chapter, based on a
World Bank research paper, takes us one step further to fine tune the role of ownership of
assets vis-a-vis competition through multiplicity.' In essence, the paper gathers ample
evidence to answer this question: Is multiplicity as important as ownership in the
efficiency of electricity provision?
3.1 The Rationale
The discussion so far has been based on the premise that transfer of ownership of
assets from the public to the private sector is a prerequisite to efficient provision of
electricity service [see Section 1.3]. Another option that does not necessarily involve
privatization is introducing multiplicity, i.e., competition, in and for service production,
and devolving responsibilities to regional, state, or local authorities.2 We need to know
whether one, a combination of both, or a proper sequence of these options would lead to
better provision of electricity service. This requires a methodology that measures
efficiency of service delivery for different structures of provision.
Previous empirical analyses on the relative performance of services under
different provision regimes have been inadequate for a number of reasons.3 First, few of
them have accounted for the combined effects of ownership and multiplicity. Second, the
analyses have mostly considered profitability as the sole indicator of efficiency, and have
'Humplick, Frannie, Does ownership matter more than ownership in the efficiency of
Infrastructure services?, Editors: Batten, D.F., and Karlsson, C., Infrastructure and the
complexity of economic development, Springer, 1996.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
generally ignored operational efficiency indicators. And third, the effects of a region's
development level on the performance of service provision under different provision
regimes have not been systematically studied.
The research paper cited above explores the relative advantages of one provision
regime over another over a range of efficiency indicators while controlling for the level of
development. A model relating to the electricity provision variables of ownership and
multiplicity to production and service efficiency measures is presented. A 100 country
database has been used for the analysis.4
3.2 Methodology
At the simplest level, the relationship between service electricity provision
Figure 3. 1: Methodology
Service provision structure
Ownership (public/private)
lultiplicity (magnitude & typ
Utility performance
Source: Humplick (1996)
structure and infrastructure performance can be depicted as in Figure 3.1. A country's
endowment-characterized by its level of development and the character of its decision-
making structures-is represented as an endogenous effect determining the existing
provision structures in a country and regulating or controlling the levels of performance
4 While Humplick has used 1988 power data in her analysis, I have used 1991 data; but,
the methodology remains the same as was used in the original study.
Country's endowment
Level of development
Character of decision-making structures
of a typical utility providing infrastructure services.' The service provision structure
includes the types of ownership and the level of multiplicity involved in service
provision. Both production efficiency and service efficiency are benchmarks of utility
performance. Utility performance itself is decided by the combined effects of the
structure of service provision and the country's endowment.
3.2.1 Multiplicity, Country's Endowment, and Utility Performance
Utility performance, as described in Figure 3.1, is determined by the structure of
provision, defined along dimensions of ownership and multiplicity, and the country's
endowment defined by the achieved level of development and the decision-making
structures within a country. We have gone to considerable depths in understanding the
ramifications of public and private ownership. Acknowledging that ownership matters in
the efficient provision of service, we directly turn our focus to the other component of the
structure of service provision: multiplicity.
3.2.1.1 Multiplicity
As shown in Figure 3.1, multiplicity is defined in terms of magnitude-the
number of independent actors involved in service provision-and type, distinguishing
between vertically and non-vertically integrated production systems.6 With more number
of players vying for service provision, we would expect that corporate information and
decisions will become more transparent. By the same argument, these players ought to be
more inclined to compete for improved services. Moreover, the multiplicity of
relationships resulting from administrative processes governing relationships between
users and producers, regulators and producers, and users and regulators affects the
efficiency.' For example, with more number of service providers, the size and complexity
of such relationships may lead to inefficiencies. It has been found that in sectors
undergoing rapid technological change or characterized by extreme uncertainty, the size
and complexity of administrative functions governing the provision of service are
s Op cit, footnote 1, Humplick.
6 Ibid.
7 Spulberg, D., The Market and Regulation, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1989.
credited for deciding between success and failure." The degree of consistency in carrying
out these administrative functions also significantly impacts the role of multiplicity.
The type of multiplicity may affect the efficiency of service provision in two
ways.9 First, a service provider with the sole vertically integrated production system--
translated to single multiplicity-has little threat of competition and is, therefore, less
likely to disclose its financial information and decisions. Second, vertical integration,
favored for its reduction in working capital, elimination of relatively high transaction
costs, and acquisition of 'secure' markets can also be a notorious source of monopoly
profits. Under these circumstances, the degree of multiplicity may be increased without
losing the benefits of vertical integration by introducing vertically integrated regional
monopolies [see Section 2.5.1].
3.2.1.2 Country's Endowment
A country's endowment-consisting of its level of development and character of
decision-making bodies-has an important bearing on its infrastructure's ability to
provide efficient service. The level of development, for instance, determines two
important components that can affect the type and efficiency of service provisions.'0One
of them is the amount of resources (labor, capital, and technological expertise) available
for allocation among competing provision activities. The other component is the
country's capacity to manage large-scale activities.
Applying these factors to an under-developed economy, the generally lower levels
of education and inadequate skills, and scant public financing of long-term infrastructure
maintenance, in particular, are most likely to downgrade the quality of service provision.
8 Levy, B. and Spiller, P.T., Regulations, institutions and commitment in
telecommunications: A comparative analysis offive country studies, presented at a
seminar on Institutional Foundations of Utility Regulation: Research Results and their
Operational Implications, The World Bank Group, Watergate Hotel, Washington, D.C.,
1993.
9 Op cit, footnote 1, Humplick.
1o Ibid.
Moreover, empirical studies have shown a clear correlation between the level of
development (as measured by per capita GNP) and efficiency of service provision."
The other variable affecting provision structure is the character of decision-
making structures defined by the nature and degree of accountability and transparency of
information and decision flows; particularly the nature of liberties.' 2 Empirical evidence
suggests that political and civil rights are positively and significantly correlated with real
national income per head and its growth." After controlling for income growth and
regional effects, liberties appear to be strongly and positively associated with measures of
overall education.' 4
Indicators of political and civil liberties have been developed by Gastil."5 The
Gastil index is based on a ranking of countries according to thirty specific tests under two
criteria: political rights defined as 'rights to participate meaningfully in the political
process'; and civil liberties defined as 'rights to free expression, to organize and
demonstrate, as well as rights to a degree of autonomy'.
For each of the above criteria, Gastil has developed an index. The GAS-POL
index amalgamates various indicators such as: (a) universal suffrage, (b) the right to
compete in the political process, and (c) the right for elected officials to have a decisive
vote on public policy. For a country to score high on the GAS-POL index, it must have a
fully operating electoral procedure, usually including a significant opposition vote.
Similarly, the civil liberties index, GAS-CIV, is designed to measure the extent to
which people are able to express their opinions openly without fears of reprisals and are
protected in doing so by an independent jury. Primary attention is given to those liberties
" Queiroz, C. and Gautam S., Road infrastructure and economic development: Some
diagnosis indicators, Working paper, The World Bank, 1992.
12 World Bank, World Development Report: The challenge of development, Oxford
University Press, 1991
'~ Dasgupta, P., The state and the idea ofwell-being, Economic Journal, Vol 100,4:
supplement, 1990.
14 Op cit, footnote 12, World Bank.
" Gastil, R., Freedom in the world, Freedom House, New York, 1989. The methodology
has been modified since Gastil's index formulation in subsequent Annual Surveys of
Freedom Country Scores by Freedom House. See
http://www.freedomhouse.org/survey.htm for more details.
which are more directly related to the expression of political rights, with less attention
given to those liberties that are expected to affect individuals in their private capacity.
3.2.1.3 Utility Performance
Infrastructure performance may be analyzed at three levels 16: (1) at the level of the
beneficiaries as measured by service quality or service effectiveness; (2) at the level of
internal operations of the entities producing a service as measured by operational or
managerial efficiency; and (3) at the sectoral level where size and growth in investments
in infrastructure are important. Humplick's paper focuses primarily on the first two
levels.
At the first level, measures of unsatisfied demand or service interruptions can be
used as reliable surrogates of service quality. In the electricity industry, system losses,
voltage fluctuations, loss of load probability (LOLP) are examples of such measures. At
the second level, measures of operational efficiency may be categorized as follows: (a)
labor productivity (e.g., number of customers per employee); (b) proficiency in extending
services to customers (e.g., GWh/customers, percentage access to service, generation
capacity factor), and (c) responsiveness to new demand (e.g., availability of new service
types such as data transmission capabilities in telecommunications).' 7
The two levels of utility performance have a cause and effect relationship. Low
operational efficiency of a utility may manifest as poor service qualities in the short run
and long run. Poor service quality, in turn, affects the customer's willingness to pay and
their degree of loyalty to the mode of service provided by the utility. For example, the
customer may be willing to switch to a more reliable alternative even if it means paying
more for it. Sustained levels of poor service quality would eventually erode the available
customer and revenue base of a utility.'"
Private enterprises or highly autonomous public entities that run on commercial
principles have an explicit and direct relationship between operational efficiency and
16 Op cit, footnote 1, Humplick.
17 Ibid.
'
8 Ibid.
service effectiveness. 19 In other words, an enterprise with a low operational efficiency
over sustained periods of time will not be able to maintain service quality levels, and is
likely to go out of business unless it is propped up by government subsidies. Managers of
public enterprises, on the other hand, face objectives-often politically motivated-
beyond cost-effective service provision. [see Sections 1.2.7 and 1.3.1]. What inevitably
results is an ambiguous and indirect relationship between service quality and operational
efficiency. In any analysis it is, therefore, imperative to specify the joint or independent
effects of operational efficiency and quality of service provision.
3.3 Model Specification
The different variables described in Figure 3.1 are summarized in the
simultaneous equations below:20
Y = T (W)
S =f(X, Z) +
X=g(Y, W) +
Z =h (X, Y, W) +
where
(1)
W = exogenous variables affecting the electric utility's performance that derive
from a country's or region's endowment (level of development and nature of
decision-making environment);
S = performance profile of the utility, which is a function of the relative weights
given to operational efficiency and service quality;
X = indicators of operational efficiency such as labor productivity and
profitability;
Y = indicators of the structure of provision, which may be a combination of
ownership and multiplicity, and which may interact with the indicators of a
country's endowment (level of development and nature of the decision-
making environment);
This is primarily a result of their dependence on the user for their profitability.19 Ibid,
20 Ibid
Z = indicators of service quality or precursors to declines in service quality;
4, s, in = random terms; and
f g, h = suitably specified functions.
There are four types of relationships in equation (1). These are: (i) a structural
equation relating the development climate to the structure of service provision within a
country--this includes the percentage of public ownership of infrastructure assets and the
type and consistency of the administrative procedures governing service provision; (ii) a
measurement equation relating the indicators of performance and their respective weights
to form a performance profile S; (iii) a structural equation separating out the relative
contribution of a country's endowment and the structure of provision on the achievable
and sustainable level of operational efficiency; and (iv) a structural relationship for
evaluating service quality outcomes under different provision structures, development
climates, and achieved operational efficiency. [Figure 3.2]. Two reduced form models
from the structural relationship of Figure 3.2 can be generated from the two dimensions
of performance: X and Z.21
Z= a+ pX+yY+ W+rl
X = +Y + 8W + (2)
The relationships in equation (2) include: (i) the measurement of performance
through direct variables Z of service customers as perceived by a user, and variables
affected by decision flows X taken by service producers in day to day operations; and (ii)
the limitations imposed on achievable performance by the prevailing structure of
provision Y and the country's endowment W. Equation (2) thus implicitly captures the
structural and measurement effects presented in the first two models in equation (1)
[Figure 3.3].
A specific application of this model to the provision of power is shown in Figure
3.4. Performance is measured by three indicators of operational efficiency and one
precursor to poor service quality. The number of customers per employee, denoted by x,,
is used as a measure of utility efficiency from the consumers perspective. Other measures
21 Ibid.
Figure 3. 2: Structural and Measurement Relationships
Structural relationship Measurement relationship
Figure 3. 3: Full Model Specification
Source: Humplick
of production efficiency are the generation capacity factor, denoted by x2, and the number
of employees per GWh produced, denoted by x3. The generation capacity factor indicates
the extent to which installed capacity is used in generating electricity. It is computed
according to the formula:
Generation capacity factor = Gross output (GWh) * 1000 *100%
Installed capacity (MW) * 8760 (h)
A variable termed system losses and denoted by z, is used as a surrogate for service
quality. System losses are defined as:
System losses = Net generation - Total sale
Net generation
System losses consist of two components: technical and non-technical losses.
Technical losses are attributed to the resistive losses caused by electrical current flowing
through a wire. These losses are generally constant for a given network of transmission
and distribution lines. Non-technical losses-the more worrisome component-include
illegal consumption of electricity and poor revenue collection. System losses, in effect,
reflect both service quality and operational efficiency.
The structure of provision shown in Figure 3.4 is represented by three variables:
Figure 3. 4: Application to the Power Sector
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The indicator of ownership is denoted by y, and defined by the percentage installed
capacity which is publicly owned; 22 where installed capacity refers to the rated capacity
as stated on the nameplate of the equipment in a power plant. The installed capacity
differs from the available capacity in that the latter is a function of equipment efficiency.
Multiplicity is represented by two variables denoted by: (i) y2, which represents
the magnitude of multiplicity as measured by the number of independent actors involved
in service production; and (ii) Y3 representing the type of multiplicity which is based on
the industry structure in use. The type of multiplicity found in the electric industry is
summarized in Figure 3.5.23 For the purpose of the analysis, the different structural
arrangements are listed below with the numbers representing the multiplicity type index:
(1) National integrated monopoly in charge of generation, transmission, and distribution.
(2) Regionally integrated monopolies in charge of generation, transmission, and
distribution.
(3) National generation and transmission, with regional distribution monopolies.
(4) Competing generation, national transmission with generation, and regional
distribution monopolies.
(5) Competing generation, national transmission, and regional distribution monopolies.
(6) Competing generation, national transmission, regional distribution monopolies
competing with generators.
The endowment variables affecting the structure of provision and included in the
analysis are: the level of development achieved, represented by per capita GNP and
denoted by w,, and the nature of the decision-making in a country represented by the
GASTIL index--varying between one (most democratic/free) to seven
22 The term 'public' comprises the undertakings whose essential purpose is the
production, transmission and distribution of electrical energy. These may be private
companies, co-operative organizations, local or regional authorities, nationalized
undertakings or government organizations. In contrast, 'self-producers' includes
undertakings which, in addition to their main activities, themselves produce (individually
or in combination) electrical energy intended, in whole or in part, to meet their own
needs. See Energy Statistics Yearbook 1994, United Nations, 1996.
23 Besant-Jones, J.E., Reforming the policies for electric power in developing countries,
Industry and Energy Department, The World Bank, 1992.
Figure 3. 5: Generic Structural Models for Power Industry Structure
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(least democratic/free)--denoted by w2.24
3.4 Analysis
The data set used to estimate the relationships in equation (1) and to quantify the
relationships between Figures 3.1 through 3.5 included in a collection of performance
indicators from 96 developing countries. The purpose for using the data was two-fold: (i)
to confirm the structure of the model that postulates a two-level relationship between
precursors to poor service quality and operational inefficiency; and (ii) to measure the
size and statistical significance of postulated effects. Binary investigations between sets
of variables are used for the first objective while two-stage least squares to estimate
equation (2) using the indicators defined in Section 3.3. The results are summarized in
Figures 3.6 through 3.11 and Appendices 6.2 through 6.6, respectively.
3.4.1 Performance and the Structure of Provision
A relationship between system losses-a measure of service inefficiency-and
the structure of power infrastructure is depicted in Figure 3.6. Despite wide scatter, we
see that system losses decrease as the percentage of public ownership increases.
Strictly speaking, the definition of public ownership from data sources available
does not differentiate among nationalized undertakings, joint or independent stock-
holding companies, or private providers [see Footnote 22]. It would, however, be
reasonable to assume that low-income developing countries have a predominance of
federally- or state-owned electric utilities and transmission systems.
A similar plot relating the percentage system losses to the magnitude of
multiplicity shows the same degree of scatter with a definite declining trend in losses [see
Figure 3.7]. This plot indicates that, as the magnitude of multiplicity increases, by having
more actors involved in service provision, the degree of service inefficiency decreases
(lower system losses). The amount of scatter observed in Figure 3.7 could be attributed to
the size and complexity of the decision-making environment. The type of multiplicity-
as measured by the six production structures in Figure 3.5-also appears to have a slight
24 Op Cit, footnote 1, Humplick.
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negative correlation with system losses [see Figure 3.8]. As we shall see in our two-stage
least-squares estimate, a country's endowment appears to be a significant deciding factor
of system losses. Figure 3.9 shows the effect of the type of multiplicity on production
efficiency-measured by the number of customers per employee. In this figure, as in
Figures 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8, there is a lot of scatter and the correlation between the two
variables is negligible.
The above results indicate that a binary relationship between production structure
and performance is not sufficient to capture the main effects. A joint estimation of the
models in equation (2), as is presented later in this section, allows us to extract the main
effects which remain hidden in binary representations such as those shown in Figures 3.6
through 3.9.
3.4.2 Performance and a Country's Endowment
The effects of variables such as per capita GNP and the GASTIL index was also
investigated as shown in Figures 3.10 and 3.11. These figures indicate that the countries
with higher levels of development have, with a lot of scatter, more efficient services (see
Figure 3.10). Reduction in the transparency of decision-making, as measured by a high
GASTIL index, induce declines in performance, as demonstrated by increasing system
losses with reductions in the transparency of decision-making (see Figure 3.11).
3.5 Estimation Results
To confirm and explicitly measure the size of the effects depicted in the last two
sections, a two-stage least squares estimation of the models in equation (2) was
performed. The results are summarized in the Appendix (Table 6b) and the details of each
estimation presented in Tables 6d, 6f, 6h, and 6j. Estimation results of Humplick's
original analysis based on 1988 data have also been presented in Tables 6c, 6e, 6g, 6i, and
6k for comparison. From Table 6b, we see that the effect of ownership has a negative
and significant relationship (at 90% confidence level) with system losses. Other
operational efficiency variables such as production efficiency-as measured by
generation capacity factor, x2, and employees per GWh produced, x--are not
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significantly affected by percent public ownership.
The above effects of ownership, however, contrast sharply with the 1988 results
as shown by Table 6c. The correlations are opposite to those of the original analysis. For
instance, system losses is positively correlated with public ownership in the earlier
results. Similarly, employees per GWh decline with increased public ownership.
Unlike the sharp differences in ownership effects, the effects of multiplicity-
both type (y2) and magnitude (y3)-appear to be more strengthened in 1991. Both of these
variables have significant relationships with customers per employee, x,. In 1992,
however, the previously positive correlation between y3 and x, is now negative.
The impact of per capita GNP-surrogate for managerial capacity--on system
losses, customers per employee, and employees per GWh are statistically significant at
90% significant levels and higher in 1991 (Table 6b). From 1988 analysis, we observe
that per capita GNP also had significant relationship with generation capacity factor
(Table 6c).
The decision-making endowment, measured by wl, has a negative and significant
relationship with system losses, z, in 1991 while that for 1988 was positive and
significant. Moreover, in contrast to 1991, w, had significant relationships with
generation capacity factor (x2) and employees per GWh produced (x3) in 1988.
Examining the detailed estimation results for 1991 and 1988, we see that both
analyses converge at the negative and significant z-w, relationship. This relationship
suggests that the greater the managerial capacity of a service provider, lesser its service
quality (Tables 6d and 6e). Apart from this, the other variables-namely y, and w2-have
inconsistent relationships with z for the two different years. Combining these effects, it
may be said that the decision-making environment (w2) and structure of ownership (y,)
are not as important determinants of service quality (z) as managerial capacity, indicated
by per capita GNP (w,).
As seen from Tables 6f and 6g, no variables significantly affected operational
efficiency, indicated by customers per employee (x,), in 1988; however, in 1991,
multiplicity variables figure very prominently in the analysis. A higher magnitude of
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multiplicity (y2)--through increased competition-seems to lead to a definite increase in
the customers per employee. The effect of systems unbundling-indicated by the type of
multiplicity (y3)-however, changes sign and significance between 1988 and 1991. This
inconsistency may be explained as follows: Utilities that moved towards unbundling their
power systems since 1988 may not have necessarily downsized their staffs, particularly
where no divestitures of public assets are involved. Alternatively, an unbundled portion-
generation, transmission, or distribution--of a utility is likely to have access to fewer
customers on average at least during the transition period.
In 1991, no variables appear to have a statistically significant relationship with
operational efficiency-as measured by generation capacity factor (x2) (Table 6h). This is
in sharp contrast from 1988 when the country's endowment (both per capita GNP and
decision-making environment) had strong effects on generation capacity factor (Table 6i).
Combining these results, we see the predominance of managerial and regulatory capacity
over ownership structure in determining the impacts on service quality and operational
efficiency of energy provision.
The above conclusions are further strengthened when we observe the significant
relationships between a country's endowment and operational efficiency-as measured
by employees per GWh produced (x3)-as shown in Tables 6j and 6k. Accordingly, a
country with a higher per capita is likely to have lower employees per GWh produced
(Table 6j). Moreover, a country with a lacking transparent decision-making environment
is also likely to have more employees per GWh produced (Table 6k).
3.6 Limitations of the Analysis
The results of the analysis need to be interpreted with caution.26 First, the choice
of indicators affects the meaning of the results. For example, the inverse of labor
productivity is labor intensity. When comparing across a wide range of countries,
presumably with different labor costs and at different levels of development, one may be
measuring a policy choice rather than true inefficiency. Second, the direction of causality
assumed in this analysis also affects the interpretation. If one observes that when there are
26 Op Cit, footnote 1, Humplick.
multiple providers of electricity services are more efficient by some measures, is this a
result of multiplicity or that multiplicity has been possible where generation of services is
more efficient? To examine this, a performance profile for multiplicity under two
scenarios is constructed. The two scenarios are monopoly (multiplicity =1) and
multiplicity with more than one service provider. Consider the means of a typical
performance profile, gt', = [111, 12 13, 9,0 14 ] representing the mean performance, say of a
group of countries where the provision of electricity is through a public monopoly.
Figure 3. 12: Multiplicity under Mixed Ownership
9
8
_) 7
-.J
4* 5
S 4
3
( 2
0
Employees/GWh Employees System Losses Unit Cost
Performance Indicators
--- Monopoly -4-- Multiplicity
Consider another group of countries, where the provision of infrastructure is
through a number of public enterprises-that is there is multiplicity. We denote the
population means by P'2 = [Pt21, g22, 9239, 24]. Figure 3.12 shows performance profiles for
both monopoly and multiplicity. The four performance indicators used are employees per
GWh, number of employees, percentage system losses, and the unit cost of service
provision. It should be noted that the units for each of these indicators have been
normalized. A lower performance level would indicate a lower value of the performance
indicators. For example, for all the performance indicators in Figure 3.12, we observe that
performance is consistently better in a multiplicity environment than that in a monopoly
environment. The profiles strongly support the thesis that, all other things being equal,
multiplicity has a positive effect on the performance of electricity service provision.
3.7 Summary
The results of our empirical investigation can be summed up in three points: First,
ownership is not as important a determinant of service quality as managerial capacity.
Our discussions from Chapter 1, however, suggest that managerial capacity has found to
be generally lacking in state-owned electric utilities in low income countries. How do we
reconcile these two observations? Figure 3.13 may help us understand where ownership
becomes an overriding concern.27
Figure 3. 13: Relationship between Managerial Capacity and Ownership Structure
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As shown above, starting from the left-most end, managerial capacity decreases
with the decline in percentage public ownership-as indicated by per capita GNP up and
till approximately 10% of the base value, or $850. Below this value, percentage public
27 Per capita GNP was normalized by taking Cyprus, the country with the highest per
capita GNP (US$8640), as the base of 100%.
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ownership actually increases with continued steady decline in managerial capacity. This
suggests that the composition of the ownership structure of countries to the right of the
curve is different from that of the left side. At this point, we refine our earlier assertion
(Section 3.4.1) that low-income developing countries have a predominance of federally-
or state-owned electric utilities and transmission systems by adding that countries with
per capita GNP of $850 or lower are likely to fit into the "low-income" category.
Accordingly, developing countries to the left of the curve are likely to have mixed or
even wholly private ownership structures. In the former case, therefore, ownership does
become a crucial factor and the result is usually an improvement in performance with
decreasing roles for the state in electricity service provision.
Second, magnitude of multiplicity, all other things being equal, does improve the
operational efficiency of electricity provision.
And finally, the most conclusive of all, the country endowment indicators are the
strongest determinants of three out of the four performance efficiency parameters. An
able and autonomous management to provide electricity service combined with a
transparent decision-making environment go a long way in improving the quality and
operational efficiency of that service.
These points have important ramifications for strengthening the basis for our
discussion in the next chapter. In low income countries where managerial and
institutional capacities are weak, the inflow of private capital for energy infrastructure
investments may signal a need for reforms in the current provision structure. These
reforms would have to include a change in the ownership structure and/or competition
with an appropriate regulatory framework.
4. FINANCING STRATEGIES FOR THE POWER SECTOR
4.1 Overview
We have so far demonstrated that private ownership has the appeal of bringing in
private investment in a usually capital-hungry power infrastructure sector and promoting
long-term efficiency gains through effective corporate governance. Our next step is to
explore the different options a developing country government or a developer has at its
disposal to finance power projects. Studies have shown that private financiers are able to
mobilize the funds necessary to finance infrastructure projects, and private sponsors
willing to accept both project and country risks, provided that the institutional
environment has met certain minimum standards and the projects appropriately
structured.' Governments are assisting this process by creating new opportunities for
private investors in an effort to bring more efficiency to project construction and
operation, greater competition in the supply of infrastructure services, and greater access
to international capital markets. Limited recourse project financing of power generation
projects has been widely promoted as a solution to the intractable problem of getting
private credit to a sector dominated by noncreditworthy borrowers and public agencies.2
When the lights are going out, incumbent power enterprises are financially unviable, and
the public purse is nearly empty, project financing of independent power producers (IPPs)
may seem the only way to get new capacity fast. In the developing world, however, the
public-private partnership in project-financed IPP ventures has been disappointingly slow
to produce results. In the long run, however, power finance soothsayers predict increasing
marginalization of project financing. In this chapter, we will marshal evidence that
supports this prediction.
Bond, Gary and Carter Laurence, Financing private infrastructure projects: Emerging
trends from IFC's experience, IFC Discussion Paper No. 23, IFC, 1994.
2 Jechoutek, Karl G. and Lamech, Ranjit; Private Power Financing - From Project
Finance to Corporate Finance, FPD Notes, The World Bank, October 1995.
4.2 Strategies
As discussed in Section 1.2.1, the current power infrastructure investment demand
outstrips the supply of available foreign exchange. In such a scenario, four broad
financing strategies can be listed:3
1. A reduction in investment levels in the power sector by improving efficiency
2. An increase in the amount of aid being spent in the power sector
3. An increase in private foreign investment in the power sector
4. An increase in domestic finance for power sector development
4.2.1 Reduction in Investment Levels
There are two ways to approach this: First, the demand for electricity can be
reduced. Second, the use of electricity use can be restricted to those that can pay for it.
The first aspect essentially deals with measures to increase the supply-side and demand-
side efficiencies.4 There is little debate regarding the possibilities of increasing these
efficiencies. The problem, however, lies with the process of achieving and sustaining
efficiency gains in practice especially when the efficiency trend is currently worsening in
many developing countries.5 Most policy options include increasing the flow of finance
for both capital and recurrent expenditure and in increasing local managerial and
technical capacities. But the increased supply of such resources is frequently constrained
by the macroeconomic and political situation facing both utilities and governments.
Where resources are available for improvement it is often found that a cut in
electricity needs is likely to be constrained on the supply side rather than the demand side
(though this may be due in part to low electricity prices).6 More efficient power supply
would, therefore, increase the amount of electricity sold rather than necessarily postpone
the need for new power capacity.
3 Barnett, Andrew, The financing ofelectric power projects in developing countries,
Energy Policy, April 1992.
4 Bell, Martin, Continuing industrialization climate change and international technology
transfer, A report prepared in collaboration with the Resource Policy Group, Norway,
Science Policy Research Unit, Sussex University, UK, 1990.
5 Op cit, footnote 3, Barnett, 1992.
The second option is grounded on the premise that electricity should be supplied
only to those consumers that can afford to pay its full cost.7 Accordingly, electricity for
domestic consumption is a luxury good that should neither attract aid funds nor subscribe
to subsidies for equity reasons. For private foreign investors, the flow of funds is largely
determined by the perception of whether they can get their money back from investments
in the power sector, and this is decided more by the creditworthiness of the economy than
the viability of particular projects.s Studies indicate that indebtedness in developing
countries has already lead to a decline in power investment.' This fall in investment can
be a major constraint to achieving economic growth in the modem sectors of developing
countries.
4.2.2 Increase in Aid
As evidenced in Section 1.2.1 any increase in aid to the power sector appears
unlikely in the near future. The downward trend in aid allocations appears to have ceased
for the moment; however, there seems little evidence that the international community is
willing or even capable of substantially increasing aid allocation." Moreover, interest
rates at historically unprecedented levels and a hardening of import restriction to
Northern markets, for example, through the common tariffs surrounding the single
European Market are likely to continue." The pressure within the donor society to shift
the balance of funding towards direct support of poor people and to rural development
will further reduce the amounts of aid available for power projects.
Against this background of unchanging aid volume, there is a possibility that the
current terms and conditions of aid flows may change. Tying aid to goods and services
6 bid.
7Ibid.
8 Lamb, Christina, Power surge on the Parana river, Financial Times, May 7, 1991.
9 Oliveira, A. De, The key issues facing the electricity systems of developing countries,
The synthesis report of the cooperative program on energy and development, DG XVII,
Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 1991.
'o Op cit, footnote 3, Barnett 1992.
" Ibid.
supplied by the donor country's industry is one such example. 12 The trend, however, is to
move away from tied aid.'3 While this may result in lower costs of power equipment to
developing countries, such untying might equally reduce the amount of aid developed
countries are willing to provide.
Restructuring of electric utilities and price liberalization have also become
integral to multilateral aid conditionality-mediated by lending agencies like the World
Bank. This usually requires tariff formulation based on cost recovery, improved corporate
governance, and some target for self-financing.'14 Some of these conditionalities aim to
reduce the 'interference' and wider economic and developmental objectives of
governments; however, they also tend to assume that the problems of the utility can be
isolated from more widespread problems of the economy. [See Sections 1.2.7 and 1.3]
Another issue of potential controversy is subsidizing effect of aid-in the form of
grants--on capital expenditure." Where the aid is initially in the form of a grant, it is
regarded by many donors to be good practice for the funds to be on-lent to the electric
utility on commercial terms in local currency. However, where this is not done, their
funds are clearly more attractive to the utility as being at best a grant and at worst
additions to their equity on which they pay little or no dividend.'6 As a result, this can
make funds for new capital equipment far cheaper than funds to meet recurrent
expenditures. This subsidizing effect, in turn, leads to deferred maintenance expenditures,
higher future operating costs, and higher system losses.
4.2.3 Increase in Private Investment through Limited Recourse Project Financing
The third option of attracting a larger volume of private investment to the power
sector appears to offer some hope for meeting at least a portion of growing power needs.
12 Ibid.
13 There is considerable variation in the tied component for various donor agencies: well
over half (65%) of the Japanese ODA is untied while less than 8% of Italian aid is, Ibid.
'4 Munasinghe, Mohan, Gilling, J., Mason, Melody, A review of World Bank lending for
electric power, Working Paper Series Number 107, Industry and Energy Department,
World Bank, Washington, DC, 1989.
~5 Op Cit, footnote 3, Barnett, 1992.
'
6 Ibid.
One reason for this optimism lies in the fact that developing countries are major
customers of power equipment manufacturers in the North.1 7 These suppliers recognize
that without additional investment from private sources their sales will not be
forthcoming.
Many of the proposed schemes required to attract foreign capital derive from
limited recourse project financing or concession financing schemes. '" In developing-
country markets the characteristics of these schemes match with the desire of many
developing countries to obtain longer term commitments from contractors by imposing
equity requirements and technical and operating support on potential projects.'9
The most common form of non-recourse finance are Build Operate and Transfer
(BOT) schemes where the contractors have the responsibility to build and operate a
facility efficiently and in return they get the rights to sell the produce and rights to a
proportion of revenues for a fixed period after which the facility reverts to the project
sponsor.20
Despite apparent successes, 21 project financing in power infrastructure has
delivered only a fraction of what was anticipated.22 One major reason for this
disappointing performance is the high-risk nature of power projects that make debt-
providers increasingly wary about the current capital asset structure of project financing.
The typical debt-equity ratio of today's project finance market is 70:30 in developing
'
7 Ibid.
18 In project financing or structured financing, the lender looks to the project's cash flows
to repay the debt, and to the project's assets for security. Project sponsors seek project
finance because it means the project can be funded off their balance sheet. Self-standing
projects, with no guarantees given by the sponsors to lenders for the project, are known as
non-recourse. In practice, most projects have limited recourse financing, where sponsors
commit to provide contingent financial support, above their up-front equity commitment,
to give lenders extra comfort. See Bond, Gary and Carter, Laurence, Financing energy
projects: Emerging trends from IFC's experience, IFC, Discussion Paper No. 23, 1994.
'9 Euromoney, April 1989.
20 Op Cit, footnote 3, Barnett, 1992.
21 An example of a non-recourse project in the power sector is Citicorp putting together
$200 million for a gas-fired co-generation project in Hopewell, Virginia.
countries and 80:20 in more-developed markets. 23 When developers are coming to debt
providers-particularly banks-with the intention of minimizing their own company
risks, the lenders hesitate to commit to an asset that could prove to be difficult to liquidate
in the event of failure, particularly in developing countries. Debt providers typically do
not share in the potential upside gains with the current debt-equity ratio and they stand to
lose considerably in the event of default or bankruptcy.24 This perception of potential risk
gets translated into high transaction costs.25
Project developers, in effect, will have to restructure the present debt-equity ratio
to the extent that equity levels are raised from 20-30% to at least 50%.26 The corollary of
this conclusion is that larger developers will displace smaller ones on the basis of their
financial strengths to provide larger equities. With fewer larger players, the use of
limited-recourse financing with its long lead times and high costs is likely to be an
uncompetitive strategy. Except in cases where the "country risks" are considerably high
and project financing offers the only alternative, successful bidders of power projects will
be those willing to put their balance sheets at risk in order to reach financial closure.27
Balance-sheet financing, or corporate financing, is the last option in our list of financing
strategies that we take up next.28
4.2.4 Increase in Private Investment through Corporate Financing
In traditional corporate financing, lenders rely on the overall creditworthiness of
the enterprise financing a new project to provide them security. If the enterprise is
22 Between 1993 and 1995, only 10% of the over 600 letters of intent or MOUs between
developers and governments for over 300,000 MW reaches financial closure. Data from
RCG/Hagler Bailly Inc., Arlington, Virginia.
23 Churchill, Anthony A., Beyond project finance, The Electricity Journal, June, 1995.
24 Ibid
25 Author Anthony Churchill predicts the costs for preparing a typical limited-recourse
financing are between $4 million and $8 million, and could go as high as $30 million in
larger projects. Ibid.
26 The normal debt-equity ratio of the electric power sector in the much less risky US
market is 50:50.Ibid.
27 Ibid. See Section 4.2.4 on UK's example of corporate finance.
28 In corporate financing, lenders look to the cash flow and assets of the whole company
to service the debt and provide security. Op Cit, footnote 19, IFC, 1994.
publicly held, information on its performance and viability is usually available through
stock markets, rating agencies, and other market-making institutions. This combination of
security, liquidity, and information availability allows debt to be issued at a lower cost
than through project finance. 29 Moreover, diversification of an enterprise's overall risk
also lowers the cost of equity. This lowering of costs of debt and equity, in effect, lowers
the cost of capital in corporate finance. When the lenders perceive lower risks, corporate
finance should also have considerably lower transaction costs. Systematic empirical
evidence specific to the power sector in the developing world is lacking, but anecdotal
evidence suggests that corporate finance is indeed cheaper than project finance.30 For
example, the IPP experience in the United States indicates that the project-financed
independent generation model may not necessarily be the most efficient mode for capital
formation in generation.3 ' While it has been shown that the cost of capital for a
purchasing U.S. utility may be higher if it chooses to build its own generation capacity
rather than purchase power from an IPP, much of this advantage is due to the adversarial
regulatory environment in the United States, which favors IPPs.32 Purchasing electricity
from an IPP, therefore, appears to be less risky as all costs can be passed through or
expensed through this arrangement.
Against this background, there is growing evidence that balance-sheet support is
increasing in private power production. At a time when developing country governments
are being advised by donor agencies to allow for competitive bidding in awarding power
projects, successful bidders will be the ones who are able to find financing at the lowest
29 Jechoutek, Karl G and Lamech, Ranjit, Private powerfinancing-From project finance
to corporate finance, Private Sector Notes No. 56, The World Bank, October, 1995.
30 Ibid.
3' The United States pioneered generation by independent operators on a merchant basis,
and it is where the now ubiquitous term independent power producer, or IPP, originated.
Project-financed independent generators have thrived in the United States, contributing
more than half the additions to generation capacity in recent years. See Kahn, Steward,
Stoft, Steven, and Belden, Timothy Impact ofPower Purchased from Non-Utilities on the
Utility Cost of Capital, Utilities Policy 5(1): 3-11, 1995.
32 In the 1970s and 1980s, many utilities and their bondholders were hurt when regulators
disallowed cost recovery for large investments in capacity. Op Cit, footnote 30, Jechoutek
et al., 1995.
cost. In the competitive international IPP market, three specific trends indicate that
balance sheet support is the preferred means for achieving this cost-of-capital
advantage:33
The first indicator is that of project developers raising capital using their parents'
balance sheets. Project developers are putting their own balance sheets at risk--or those
of their parent companies-to raise cheaper debt for projects and to finance their equity
contribution. For example, California Energy pioneered the largest corporate financing in
the independent power business, raising US$530 million through ten-year securitized
bonds in March 1994. Other examples include the Puerto Quetzal project in Guatemala
(Enron), the Puerto Plata project in the Dominican Republic (Enron), and the Upper
Mahaiao and Mahanagdong projects in the Philippines (California Energy). Chinese IPP
developers, such as Huaneng Power and Xinli have also used their own balance sheets to
raise finance. 34
The second trend is that of project developers creating consolidated balance
sheets. Developers are pooling projects into entities that are then able to raise capital on
the strength of a combined balance sheet comprising the "pooled" assets of the different
projects. Providers of equity and debt then finance the business of building and operating
private generation facilities rather than an individual power plant. Pooling not only
spreads project risk, but for multinational developers, it also reduces country-specific
risk. IPP sponsors that have used this approach include Consolidated Electric Power Asia
(CEPA), the San Francisco-based Bicoastal Energy Investors Fund (EIF), and Huaneng
Power International (HPI) of China. 35
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 CEPA raised debt and equity in the capital markets on the basis of its corporate strategy
of building multiple power plants in Asia. EIF securitized its equity interests in sixteen
independent power projects in the United States, creating a synthetic balance sheet and
issuing US$125 million of seventeen-year bonds. And HPI, which owns 2,900 megawatts
of capacity under commercial operation and has another 5,900 megawatts under
construction, raised US$332 million by listing its IPP business on the New York Stock
Exchange in October 1994. Ibid.
The final trend is the increasing industry consolidation through mergers and
acquisitions in the IPP business. Examples of some notable transactions among
international players include the purchase of CMS Generation by HYDRA-CO
Enterprises, the purchase of Magma Energy by California Energy Inc. and the acquisition
of J. Makowski Co. Ltd. by PG&E Enterprises and Bechtel Enterprises to form
International Generating Co. Ltd.36 It has been argued that the increasing size and scope
of projects is the main factor driving this change. Smaller companies are at an important
disadvantage in international capital markets compared with larger players, with the
latter's greater experience, capitalization, and track records [See Section 4.2.3]. Although
these mergers and acquisitions could be driven by a number of strategic objectives,
increased balance sheet support in project development is clearly one of them."
Apart from the evidence of increasing balance-sheet support for IPPs, this kind of
financing is likely to become the default alternative in a restructured power-sector.
Traditional project finance is based on allocating demand risk to the purchaser,
whether an integrated utility, a central generator and purchaser, a distribution utility, or a
large consumer.38 This risk allocation works well because purchasers have a monopoly
franchise area, which they are obliged to serve. Against a retail competition scenario,
however, purchasing utilities will face increased demand risk as the loss of customers
becomes a greater possibility. Innovative sharing of demand risk between market
players-the power seller, the power purchaser, and the financier-will, therefore,
become necessary. 39 An IPP developer's ability to bear any of the demand risk will
depend in part on its willingness to provide corporate assets and revenues as a fallback
for lenders. For example, the most recent additions to generation capacity in the United
Kingdom-the model of sector unbundling-have been corporate-financed IPPs. 40
Similarly, industry players in the United States are creating highly capitalized
enterprises as competition for retail consumers looms on the horizon. The recently
36 Ibid
37 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
announced US$1.26 billion merger of Public Service Co. of Colorado and Southwestern
Public Service Co. is a reaction to the perceived increase in demand risk stemming from
plans for wider retail competition.41
All said and done, greater corporate finance support has paved way for wider,
deeper, and cheaper sources for raising private capital for independent power generation.
Our next quest is to find what role capital markets play in sustaining balance-sheet
financing.
4.2.4.1 The Role of Capital Markets
Capital markets are financial markets where private investors turn to for their debt
and equity requirements. The amount of debt or equity granted to an established
enterprise is based on the strength of its balance sheet. An increase in size and activity of
a capital market, by extension, should reflect the status of corporate financing involved.
Going by the argument that project financing will eventually have to give way to
corporate financing, development of domestic capital markets is a must to accommodate
massive infrastructure investments in developing countries. After having raised capital to
build the infrastructure, developers, international and local alike, would want an exit
strategy that allows them to realize their capital gains by selling their equity and parking
the debt elsewhere.42 Local capital markets are in the best position to absorb these assets.
4.2.4.2 Trends in Domestic Capital Markets
Following from the previous discussion, growth trends of capital markets in
countries where private infrastructure investments are taking place would be a reliable
indicator of increasing corporate finance. The search for existence of such trends will be
the aim of this section.
41 Ibid.
42 Churchill, Anthony, Beyond Project Finance, p.24, Electricity Journal, June 1995.
We begin this analysis by defining capital market development measures that
were used by Ross Levine and Asli Demirguc-Kunt (May 1995) in a statistical report
published by the World Bank.43
A. Stock Market Development Indicators
(i) Stock Market Size
The market capitalization ratio equals the value of listed shares divided by GDP
and analysts frequently use the ratio as a measure of stock market size. In the rest of this
discussion, we refer to this measure as "market capitalization". In terms of economic
significance, the assumption behind market capitalization is that market size is positively
correlated with the ability to mobilize capital and diversify risk.
(ii) Liquidity
In simple terms, liquidity refers to the ability to easily buy and sell securities. A
comprehensive measure of liquidity would quantify all the costs associated with trading,
including the time costs and uncertainty of finding a counterpart and settling the trade.
Since data is very limited for a cross-country comparison of liquidity, Levine et al. have
used two measures of realized stock trading.
The first measure is the total value traded / GDP equals value of total shares
exchange divided by GDP. This ratio measures the organized trading of equities as a
share of national output and therefore should positively reflect liquidity on an economy-
wide basis. The total value traded / GDP ratio complements the market capitalization
ratio. Although market capitalization may be large, there may be little trading.
A second measure of liquidity is the turnover ratio. Turnover equals the value of
total shares traded divided by market capitalization. High turnover is often used as an
indicator of low transaction costs. The turnover ratio also complements market
capitalization. A small but active market will have small market capitalization but above
average turnover. Turnover also complements total value traded / GDP. While total value
traded / GDP captures trading compared with the size of the economy, turnover measures
43 The definitions and methodology used for this analysis are borrowedfrom Stock Market
Development and Financial Intermediaries, a World Bank's Policy Research Working
Paper by Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Ross Levine, May 1995.
trading relative to the size of the stock market. Put differently, a small, liquid market will
have a high turnover ratio but a small total value traded / GDP ratio.
(iii) Volatility
This indicator is a twelve-month rolling standard deviation estimate based on
market returns. Although greater volatility is not necessarily a sign of more or less stock
market development, "less volatility" is sometimes referred to as reflecting "greater stock
market development" for simplicity.
(iv) Concentration
In some countries a few companies dominate the market. To measure the degree
of market concentration, the share of market capitalization accounted for is computed by
the ten largest stocks and call this measure as concentration.
(v) Asset Pricing
Analysts generally refer to countries that are more integrated into world capital
markets and price risk more efficiently as "more developed." Asset pricing is a measure
of the degree of integration between national stock markets and gauging whether markets
price risk efficiently. To measure asset pricing efficiency, the Levine et al. use estimates
of asset mis-pricing computed by Robert Korajczyk.44 As argued by Korajczyk and
Viallet, the capital asset pricing model and arbitrage model imply that the expected return
on each asset is linearly related to a benchmark portfolios. In domestic versions of these
asset pricing models, the benchmark portfolios include only securities traded on the local
exchange, while the international versions include all securities. If the models are correct,
then the benchmark portfolio or combination of portfolios should explain all of the
systematic expected returns on assets above the risk-free interest rate. Levine et al. term
systematic deviations of expected returns as "risk mis-pricing" under the maintained
hypothesis that the model is correct.
The APT and ICAPM are the indices computed using an international arbitrage
pricing model and international capital asset pricing model, respectively. Korajczyk
(1994) computes the degree of risk mis-pricing between domestic stocks and the prices of
44 Northwestern University, Measuring Integration of Developed and Emerging Stock
Markets, mimeo.
risk in world capital markets using these two models. These risk mis-pricing indicators
measure capital market integration; with no arbitrage, the price of risk should be
equalized across national borders. Greater mis-pricing may reflect poor information about
firms, high transaction costs, and official barriers to international asset trading. For the
purpose of this analysis, the authors refer to greater mis-pricing as indicating less stock
market development.
(vi) Regulatory and Institutional Indicators
Regulatory and institutional factors may influence the functioning of stock
markets. For example, mandatory disclosure of reliable information about firms and
financial intermediaries may enhance investor participation in equity markets.
Regulations that instill investor confidence in brokers and other capital market
intermediaries should encourage investment through and trading in the stock market.
To measure regulatory and institutional features of emerging stock markets,
Levine et al. use seven indicators constructed by the International Finance Corporation
(IFC). The first indicator shows whether the firms listed in a stock market publish price-
earnings information. The IFC gives a value of 0 or 1, where 1 indicates the information
is comprehensive and published annually. The second indicator measures accounting
standards. The IFC assigns 0, 1, or 2 for countries with poor, adequate, or good
(internationally accepted) accounting standards. The third indicator measures the quality
of investor protection laws as judged by the IFC where 0,1, or 2 are used to indicate poor,
adequate, or good investor protection laws. The fourth indicator shows whether the
country has securities and exchange commission or not. The fifth, sixth, and seventh
indicator measure restrictions on dividend repatriation by foreign investors, capital
repatriation by foreign investor, and domestic investments by foreigners. The IFC assigns
values of 0,1 and 2, indicating whether capital flows are restricted, have some
restrictions, or are free, respectively. The institutional development indicator aggregates
these seven regulatory-institutional indicators by simply averaging them.
A.1. Correlation among stock market development indicators:
Table 4a provides the correlations among the many stock market development
indicators found by Levine et al. for up to 41 observations between 1986 and 1993.45
From this table, four points can be made: First, market capitalization is strongly
positively correlated with total value traded / GDP and institutional development and
negatively correlated with risk mis-pricing, volatility and market concentration. This
implies that countries with big stock markets are more efficient, less volatile, and less
concentrated. Furthermore, market capitalization has no strong correlation with turnover.
This suggests that a large market size does not necessarily increase or decrease the extent
of trading.
Second, while both measures of liquidity are strongly positively correlated to each
other, they do not move one for one. A highly liquid market also indicates a well
developed institution. Market concentration and volatility are strongly negatiyely
correlated with both indicators of liquidity. Risk mis-pricing, however, is strongly
negatively correlated with trading compared with the size of the economy while it is
insignificantly correlated with trading relative to the size of the stock market. This
suggests that liquidity with respect to the size of the national economy is more indicative
of risk pricing than that with respect to the size of the size of the domestic stock market.
Third, countries that are more internationally integrated-as measured by low APT and
ICAPM values-have less volatile stock returns and less market concentration.
Interestingly, institutional development had no significant correlation with risk mis-
pricing.
Fourth, volatility and market concentration have no significant correlation with each
other. Moreover, a highly volatile or concentrated stock market is apparently not a
reliable indicator of the extent of a country's institutional development. A.2. Overall
Stock Market Development Index:
Although many of the above stock market development indicators are
significantly correlated in intuitively attractive ways, the correlation coefficients are
45 The actual numerical relationships of various indicators in the original paper have been
replaced by symbols for simplicity. Op cit, footnote 43, Levine et al.
Table 4 a: Correlation of Stock Market Indicators, 1986-1993
Market Total Value Turnover APT Mis- ICAPM Volatility Market Institutional
Capitalization Traded/GDP Pricing Mis-Pricing Concentration Development
Market * + - - - - +
Capitalization
Total Value * + - - <- - +
Traded/GDP
Turnover * +>+ - +
APT Mis- + + +
Pricing
ICAPM Mis- * + +
Pricing
Volatility +* -
Market * ->
Concentration
Institutional *
Development
Note:
'+' indicates strong positive correlation; '-' indicates strong negative correlation; '-->' indicates insignificance of any correlation
Source: Levine et al. (1995)
frequently below 0.6. The correlations suggest that the different indicators capture
different aspects of stock market development. To measure how well stock markets
function in general, i.e., to compute an index of overall stock market development,
Levine et al. came up with the SMDI INDEX 1 which aggregates information on market
capitalization, total value traded / GDP, and turnover. The authors have also devised other
indices that capture other indicators but since market capitalization and liquidity together
are standard measures of a country's stock market development, we restrict our analysis
to the SMDI INDEX 1.
The computation of the SMDI INDEX 1 follows a two-step procedure. First, for
each country 'i' compute the means-removed market capitalization, total value / GDP,
and turnover ratios. The means-removed value of variable X for country 'i' is defined as
X(i)m = [X(i) - mean (X)] / [ABS(mean (X))] where ABS (z) refers to the absolute value
of 'z'. For mean (X), we use the average value of X across all countries over the 1976-93
period.
A.3. Rates of Growth of stock markets:
In the last section, we ranked countries according to their average levels of stock
market development over the 1986-93 period. In the context of the query this thesis
attempts to address, we are interested in finding out the most rapidly developing stock
markets to find out any relationship that exists between stock market growth and private
sector investment in power infrastructure. As in the previous section, the average annual
growths of market capitalization, total value traded / GDP, and turnover ratios are used to
find the overall growth rate of stock market index GRSMI INDEX 1. Figure 4a shows
that Indonesia, Turkey, Portugal, Venezuela, and Greece have the most rapidly growing
stock markets while Japan, Italy, Sweden, Canada, and United States have the least
growing stock markets.
While we will come back to this table later to look at specific country performances in
relation with power infrastructure investments by the private sector, some general
observations can be made at this point. For simplicity, we divide the 41 countries into
three groups. For the SMDI INDEX 1, those countries with greater than +0.5 deviation
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from the mean would be assumed to have HIGH stock market development. Those with
lower than -0.5 deviation from the mean would be assumed to have LOW stock market
development. The countries that fall within these boundaries would be thought to have
MEDIUM stock market development. Similarly, for the GRSMI INDEX 1, those
countries with lower than +0.2 deviation from the mean would be assumed to have LOW
growth rates; those with higher than +0.5 deviation from the mean would be thought to
have HIGH growth rates; and the balance would fall under the MEDIUM growth rate
category. We observe that 6 out of the 10 LOW stock market development category
countries have HIGH stock market growth rates.
B. Financial Intermediary Development:
Well established capital markets require that well developed stock markets be
complemented by matured banks and nonbank financial intermediaries. To verify this
statement, we need to find measures of financial intermediary development. Levine et al.
have come with four measures.
(i) Financial System Development
Based on work by King and Levine (1993), Levine et al. use three measures of
financial system development. The measure M3 /GDP equals liquid liabilities of the
financial intermediaries divided by GDP. It is a measure of the overall size of the formal
financial system. The second measure, QLLY, equals (M3-M1) / GDP where Ml / GDP
represents highly liquid bank deposits. The QLLY indicator thus measures quasi-liquid
liabilities. Analysts sometimes use QLLY instead of M3 / GDP because the latter may not
be as closely associated with efficient financial intermediation as longer-term investments
in financial intermediaries. In contrast, QLLY focuses on measuring longer-term or
quasi-liquid liabilities, i.e., M3 - Ml. Since liquid and quasi-liquid liabilities that finance
government deficits may not reflect the provision of efficient financial intermediary
services (such as acquiring information about firms, monitoring managers, and
facilitating transactions and risk diversification), the authors compute the variable PRIV /
GDP, which is, the ratio of domestic credit to private firms divided by GDP.45
(ii) Bank Development
To measure the level of development of the banking system, Levine et al. use
BY / GDP, which equals the ratio of the total claims of deposit in banks to GDP.
(iii) Nonbank Development
The size of non-bank financial corporations, such as finance companies, mutual
funds, brokerage houses and so on is measured by PNB / GDP which equals private
nonbank financial intermediary assets divided by GDP.
(iv) Insurance and Pension Companies
Finally, the size of private insurance and pension companies is measured by
INPE / GDP which equals private insurance company and pension fund assets divided by
GDP.
B.1. Correlations among Financial Intermediary Indicators
Levine et al. show that the measures of financial system size, M3 / GDP, QLLY,
and PRIV / GDP are very highly correlated and significant. The correlations between the
financial system size indicators and indicators of the size of banks, private nonbanks, and
private insurance and pension companies, however, are not as strong. While all of the
correlations are positive, many are not significant. For example, while countries with big
financial systems have big banks and nonbank financial corporations, the correlation
between financial system size and private insurance and pension companies is not strong.
B.2. Overall Financial Intermediary Development Index:
Similar to the methodology used in finding out the overall stock market
development index, an aggregate index for measuring the overall financial intermediary
development is computed. The FINDEX 3 combines the means-removed values of BY /
GDP, PNB / GDP, and INPE / GDP over the 1986-93 period. In other words, FINDEX 3
combines the information on the size of banking system, the size of private nonbank
45 Unfortunately, while the International Financial Statistics classifies credit as "claims on
the private sector,"some of these claims in some countries include credit to public
enterprises.
financial corporations, and the size of private. The authors have also come up with other
indices, too, but they prefer FINDEX 3 to the rest since they point out that others mix
information on particular intermediaries with information on intermediary liabilities and
the measures of liabilities span across different types of intermediaries.
We repeat the categorization of 40 observations for FINDEX 3 by grouping
countries into HIGH, MEDIUM, and LOW financial intermediary developments. Those
countries with greater than +0.5 deviation from the mean would be assumed to have
HIGH financial intermediary development. Those with lower than -0.5 deviation from the
mean would be assumed to have LOW financial intermediary development. The countries
that fall within these boundaries would be thought to have MEDIUM financial
intermediary development.
From Figure 4b, it appears that there is a strong positive correlation between
financial intermediary development and stock market development. Excluding two
countries, namely, South Africa and Thailand, all other countries with below-mean
FINDEX 3 values have below-mean SMDI INDEX 1 values.
From the discussion so far, we have empirical evidence that point to two
important results: First, countries which initially had relatively less developed stock
markets have the highest stock market growth rates in the period during 1986-1993.
These countries include Mexico, Chile, Philippines, Argentina, and Turkey among others.
Second, countries with relatively well-developed stock markets generally possessed well-
established financial intermediaries.
If combined the above results strongly suggest that rapidly growing stock markets
will need to be complemented by financial intermediary development at a positive rate, if
not at the same rate, for overall capital market development.
C. Domestic Capital Market Growth and Private Infrastructure Investment
We began this chapter with the objective of finding a correlation, if any, between
domestic capital market growth and private power-sector investments. We had so far
focused on domestic capital market growth for several countries. We now narrow down
to six countries that have not only either partially or fully privatized their infrastructures
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for providing electricity between 1989 and 1992 but have also power infrastructure stocks
traded in their respective stock markets. These countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Malaysia, Philippines, and South Korea. A summary of various categories (HIGH,
MEDIUM, and LOW) for these countries falling under the three indices, i.e., SMDI
INDEX 1, GRSMI INDEX 1, and FINDEX 3 is shown in Table 4b. Some observations of
significance can be made at this point. First, financial intermediary development appears
to follow stock market development. For example, Brazil, Malaysia, South Korea, and
have stock markets that are relatively better developed than their financial intermediaries.
The rest of the countries have equivalent levels of financial intermediary development
and stock market development.
Second, Argentina and Malaysia have the most rapidly growing stock markets.
While it appears reasonable that Argentina with a LOW initial stock market development
should be expanding the most, Malaysia stands out as a notable exception with its HIGH
stock market development already in place and still growing at a fast pace. Since we do
not have an index analogous to the GRSMI INDEX 1 that reflects the growth rate of
financial intermediary development, we borrow one of conclusions earlier made to reach
a reasonable approximation. That there is a significant positive correlation between stock
market development and financial intermediary development, we can expect that rapidly
growing stock markets would lead to a less rapid, if not equally rapid, growth of financial
intermediaries.
We now examine the growth trends of electricity stock market capitalization, net
foreign direct investment (FDI), and bonds/loans raised in international capital markets
and their effects on total stock market capitalization for the six countries at different
stages of capital markets growth.46
46 Total stock market capitalization data have been obtained from Lessons of Experience:
Financing Private Infrastructure, IFC, The World Bank, DC, 1996. Electricity/Gas utility
market capitalization data, obtained from IFC's Factbook: Emerging Markets Data Base,
have been available since 1993. For the purpose of our analysis, we have used IFC Global
(IFCG) indexes-intended to represent the performance of the most active stocks in their
respective stock markets, and to be the broadest possible indicator of market
movements-for the electricity/gas utility market capitalization.
Table 4 b: Stock Market and Financial Intermediary Development Indices, 1986-
1993
Countries SMDI INDEX 1 GRSMI INDEX 1 FINDEX 3
Argentina L H L
Malaysia H H M
Chile M L M
South Korea H M M
Philippines L M L
Brazil M M L
Argentina
From Table 4b, it can be inferred that Argentina's stock market development (SMDI
INDEX 1) and its financial intermediary development (FINDEX 3) were still in their
incipient stages and that they were growing at a rapid rate (GRSMI INDEX 1) till 1993.
From 1994 onwards, stocks of electricity/gas/sanitary services were traded in Argentina's
local stock exchange [See Table 4c]. Also worth noting is the relatively large amounts of
foreign direct investment (FDI) and international bond issues pouring into Argentina
since 1991. With no electricity stocks registered through 1993, it would be fair to say that
Argentina's electricity privatization was largely aided by FDI and bonds raised in
international capital markets.47 As evidenced by the regression results in Table 4c,
bonds/loans raised on international capital markets (X3) is a significant determinant of
total stock market capitalization. While electricity/gas/sanitary service stock
capitalization (Xl) is positively correlated with total stock capitalization, the relationship
still statistically insignificant. Also worth noting is the R2 value; the three independent
variables explain 98 per cent of the variation in total stock market capitalization.
47 Both the country's electricity and gas services were divested in 1992. See OECD,
Privatization in Asia, Europe, and Latin America, p.81,1996.
47 Both the country's electricity and gas services were divested in 1992. See OECD,
Privatization in Asia, Europe, and Latin America, p.81,1996.
Malaysia
In 1992, Malaysia carried out sales of equity (SE) of Tenega Nasional Berhad
(National Electricity Corporation) as part of its infrastructure privatizations. 48 Since the
date the company has been listed in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE), Tenega
Nasional's market capitalization has gone up by 3.2 times the original issued value.49 As
shown in Table 4c, electricity/gas/sanitary stock capitalization (Xl) is a positively
correlated with total stock market capitalization. Net FDI appears to contribute negligibly
to stock market capitalization, and bonds/loans raised in international capital markets is
negatively correlated with total stock market capitalization. For a country whose stock
market development is high [see Table 4b], these findings strongly support the thesis that
private power-sector investments have further stimulated the growth of domestic capital
markets. These findings also suggest that countries with well capitalized markets depend
less on net FDI for equity and much less on international debt.
Chile
Chile falls in between Malaysia and Argentina in terms of capital markets
development and growth [See Table 4b]. Its SMDI, FINDEX, and GRSMI indices all fall
under the MEDIUM category. Chile, however, privatized its power utilities well before
the other two countries. In 1987, shares worth US$500 million of Chile's largest power
generating company, ENDESA, were offered in the local stock market. Before 1990, the
three subsidiaries of CHILECTRA, another large state-owned power utility, were
privatized. We do not have annual stock market capitalization data for the period prior to
1990, but from the utility stock data available from 1992 onwards [See Table 4c], we can
still study the impacts of FDI and utility stocks on total stock market capitalization.
Unlike in the cases of Argentina and Malaysia, net FDI (variable X2) is a positive and
significant determinant of total stock market capitalization for Chile.so That net FDI plays
48 OECD, Privatization in Asia, Europe, and Latin America, p.42,1996
49 The increases in market capitalization for Tenega Nasional was noted in mid-March,
1994.
50 The high positive significance of variable X2 and positive insignificance of X1 is
attributed to the drastic decline in utility stock market capitalization between 1993 and
1994.
Table 4 c: Stock Market Capitalization, Electricity Stocks, and net FDI
(in millions of US dollars)
Regression Output
X1
0
0
0
125
1133
X1
0
0
5000
10189
16306
17384
X1
NA
NA
5452*
21500
12003
12110
X2
2439
4179
6305
1200
3900
X2
2333
3999
4469
5000
4300
5800
X2
590
523
699
841
1795
2300
X3
725
1529
6473
5716
3947
X3
730
512
1271
1612
3526
2397
X3
285
NA
350
775
80
903
*significant at 0.20
Regression Output
level
Regression Output
levelNA = Not Available *significant at 0.20
Y = Total stock market capitalization
X1 = Electric/gas utility stocks
X2 = Net Foreign Direct Investment
X3 = Loans/bonds raised in international capital markets
Argentina
Year
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Y
18509
18633
43967
36864
37783
Constant 11868
Std. Err. Of Y Est. 3258
R Squared 0.98
No. of Obs. 5
Degrees of Freedom 1
X1 X2 X3
X Coefficients 5.95 0.63 4.22
Std. Err. Of Y Est. 3.31 0.87 0.67
T-Statistics 1.80 0.72 6.27*
Malaysia
Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Y
48611
58627
94004
220328
199276
222729
Constant 71067
Std. Err. Of Y Est. 40700
R Squared 0.90
No. of Obs. 6
Degrees of Freedom 2
X1 X2 X3
X Coefficients 13.95 2.10 -31.80
Std. Err. Of Y Est. 11.67 34.92 61.40
T-Statistics 1.20 0.06 -0.52
Chile
Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Y
13545
27984
29644
44622
68195
72928
*Approx.
Constant 8955
Std. Err. Of Y Est. 6092
R Squared 0.97
No. of Obs. 4
Degrees of Freedom 1
X1 X2
X Coefficients 0.69 25.65
Std. Err. Of Y Est. 0.53 4.58
T-Statistics 1.29 5.59*
a major role in expanding local stock markets especially when utility stock capitalization
itself may be wavering may a plausible inference from the above analysis
South Korea
Like Malaysia, South Korea also has a highly developed stock market and
financial intermediary [See Table 4b]. The growth rate of South Korea's stock market
was, however, slower than that of Malaysia. South Korea carried out its privatization of
its electric utility, the Korean Electric Power Company (KEPCO), in 1989 on a broad-
based, popular capitalism mode of British Telecom. KEPCO offered 21 percent-
equivalent to $1.9 billion worth of shares-of its total equity to the public.51
KEPCO is now far the largest company in terms of market capitalization on the Korean
Stock Exchange. Analysis of South Korea's stock markets shows results similar to those
of Malaysia with the exception that, in this case, electricity/gas stocks is a positive
significant determinant of total market capitalization [See Table 4d]. The negative
correlation between variable X3 and Y is stronger. The Malaysian and Korean examples
demonstrate that infrastructure stocks is the largest contributing factor in deepening well
capitalized markets.
Philippines
With respect to the levels of growth of stock markets and financial intermediaries,
the Philippines share similar characteristics with Argentina [See Table 4b]. Lack of
sufficient data for bonds/loans raised in international capital markets (variable X3)
precludes us from examining the contribution of this variable to market capitalization.
That apart, results of the regression analysis show that both electricity/gas stocks and net
FDI are positive, but insignificant, determinants of market capitalization. These results
match with those of Argentina. With low stock market and financial intermediary
development, it is reasonable to conclude from the analyses of these two countries that all
" McLindon, Michael P., Privatization and capital market development: Strategies to
promote economic growth, 1996.
Table 4 d: Stock Market Capitalization, Electricity Stocks, and net FDI
(in millions of US dollars)
X2
788
1180
727
588
809
17724
X2
NA
544
228
763
1000
NA
X3
3982
6437
5204
5962
6483
11087
X3
715
NA
NA
1250
1164
673
Regression Output
Constant 12867
Std. Err. of Y Est. 16485
R Squared 0.934
No. of Obs. 6
Degrees of Freedom 2
X1 X2 X3
X Coefficients 4.59 49.33 -13
Std. Err. Of Y Est. 1.47 57.21 14
T-Statistics 3.11** 0.86 -0.93
*significant at 0.10
Regression Output
level
Regression Output
Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Y
16354
42759
45261
99430
189281
147636
X1
0
0
0
12613
25632
23594
X2
989
1103
2061
1292
3072
4859
*Approx.
NA = Not Available;
Y = Total stock market capitalization
X1 = Electric/gas utility stocks
Investment
X3
NA
1480
3010
6465
3998
7041
X2 = Net Foreign Direct
X3 = Loans/bonds raised in international capital markets
Sources:
(1) Emerging Markets Data Base, IFC Factbook, 1994-96
(2) Lessons of Experience: Financing Private Infrastructure, IFC, 1996
(3) The Irwin Guide to Investing in Emerging Markets, 1995
S. Korea
Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Y
110594
96373
107448
139420
191778
181955
Xl
0
0
0
16486
21242
24762
Philippines
Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Y
5927
10197
13794
40327
55519
58859
X1
0
0
0
3625
3871
3231
Constant 7780
Std. Err. of Y Est. 8994
R Squared 0.94
No. of Obs. 4
Degrees of Freedom 1
X1 X2
X Coefficients 8.30 10.47
Std. Err. Of Y Est. 5.13 33.80
T-Statistics 1.62 0.31
Brazil
Constant 8955
Std. Err. Of Y Est. 6092
R Squared 0.97
No. of Obs. 4
Degrees of Freedom 1
X1 X2 X3
X Coefficients 6.12 -3.45 -5.40
Std. Err. Of Y Est. 0.75 5.38 3.22
T-Statistics 8.14* -0.64 -1.70
*significant at 0.1 level
the three variables, at different level of significance, positively contribute to total stock
market capitalization.
Brazil
At first glance, the analysis of Brazil's capital market seems to be peripheral, if
not irrelevant, to our discussion on private-sector financing. Unlike Argentina and Chile,
Brazil did not decide to reform its power sector up and till 1995, when a law was passed
to permit private concessions for electric power distribution and natural gas transport.
Several Brazilian state governments have launched programs to sell state equity in
electricity distribution, telecommunications, and banks.52 While private concessionaires
had been involved in generation (0.3%) and distribution (2.1%) prior to the new law, all
policy and investment decisions have so far resided with the federal government.53
Brazil's capital market, however, allows us to carry out a "control" analysis, that
is, we can examine the impacts of all the three variables (Xl, X2, and X3) on market
capitalization in the absence of any major private-sector investment but with
electricity/gas stocks still listed in the local stock exchange. 54 The results are not
surprising: Lack of private-sector participation in the infrastructure sector appears to have
discouraged the net flow of FDI and issuance of bonds/loans in international capital
markets [See Table 4d]. Electricity/Gas stocks, on the other hand, has a strong positive,
significant correlation with total market capitalization. That Brazil's market capitalization
growth is heavily dependent on its local infrastructure stocks, in the absence of FDI and
lack of access to international capital, does not, however, bode well for future investment
demands that would eventually require foreign capital.
In conclusion, we have examined six different developing country capital
markets--each at a different level of growth and maturity-that have had electricity
stocks being traded in their local stock exchanges. While the trading of electric utility
stocks in developing countries is still a recent phenomenon, and consequently, data is too
52 World Bank, Trends in Developing Economies 1996, Washington, DC, 1996.
53 The numbers are taken from Electrobras 1994: Plan 2015: National Electric energy
plan 1993-2015, Vol. I, Executive Report Summary.
54 As of June 1992, stocks of Electrobras, Light, Cemig, and Cesp-all state-owned
power companies-were trading in the SENN stock exchange.
scant to carry out a comprehensive time-series analysis, the cross-country studies do offer
us some useful insights. First, growth of private power infrastructure investment is
strongly correlated with that of the local stock (or capital) market. Second, depending on
the existing level of capital market development growth, the significance of contributing
variables (net FDI, international bonds/loans, and electricity stocks) will vary. A nascent
and growing local capital market will require more of loans/bonds and FDI to expand
itself. A matured capital market will seek more of its own resources to finance
infrastructure investments. In effect, growth of variables on one side of equation fuels the
growth of variables on the other side and vice versa.
4.3 Summary
Despite widely varying macroeconomic conditions and political constitutions,
developing countries that have been actively pursuing private infrastructure investments
have depended on international and domestic capital markets for their partial debt and
equity requirements. Pension and insurance companies have been willing takers of equity
in infrastructure companies where long-term investments and steady returns are typical.
During the privatization process, different methods of divestiture are often employed.
Public bids, initial public offerings in the stock market, direct sales to individuals or
entities outside the stock market, management and employee buy-outs, are some of the
common approaches. Ultimately though, as we pointed out in this chapter's introductory
lines, there needs to be a clearinghouse where investors can readily exchange their debt
and equity for cash and exit from the market. Greater corporate finance support through
local and international capital markets makes it possible to raise private capital for
independent power financing from wider, deeper, and cheaper sources.
5. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INCREASED PRIVATE-
SECTOR INVESTMENT
5.1 Revisiting Earlier Premises
Throughout our discussion, we have assumed that private-sector participation in
electricity service provision of developing countries would lead to an improvement in
operational efficiency and service quality. Under this scenario, we asserted that increased
private capital---domestic and international alike--is likely to flow into what is usually a
supply-deficit power sector.
From our multiplicity-ownership analysis, we saw that while multiplicity creation
through unbundling of electricity services alone could result in performance improvement
in efficiency and service quality, the overarching requirements for investment capital and
laissez-faire in energy infrastructure provision makes private-sector involvement a prior
necessity. In other words, divestiture of state-owned assets accompanied by unbundling
of services should be a means to competitive ends. Competitive ends, in turn, is a means
to the desired end of increased economic efficiency.
The question is whether operational efficiency and private capital are always the
undisputed policy goals of private-sector participation in the power sector. It may be the
case that a government would simply want to sell off its utility for the highest price
without any genuine concern for its long-term consequence on service reliability and
tariff charges. Under this assumption, it may be in the government's best interest not to
restructure the utility to introduce competition; otherwise, investors could bid less when
they anticipate competition or effective regulation.'
In contrast, an equity-driven policy goal may be to create a widespread share
ownership by offering utility shares to individual investors and to employees. This way,
the government does not maximize the proceeds of the sale, but hopes that the country's
' Hyman, Leonard S., The Privatization of Public Utilities, Public Utilities Reports, Inc.,
1995.
economy will gain from having more shareholders. 2 Similarly, mass privatization
programs in which shares are offered to all citizens can also be politically more attractive
and less controversial.
Another question is whether competition through multiplicity in the electricity
industry is always feasible. Competitive procurement of generation has been rendered
possible by the choice of technology in a system dominated by thermal power plants (see
Section 2.3.5) and by the existence of capacity usually in the order of several thousand
megawatts. Is it possible to expect competition, for example, in an environment that is
predominantly based on renewable technology (hydropower, for instance) as the primary
resource? If so, will the rules of the game applicable to the United Kingdom, United
States, or Chile be different from those applicable to, say, Brazil? Moreover, in 1990,
there were 107 countries around the world with installed capacities less than 1,000 MW.4
How would these issues, for example, be relevant to smaller countries contemplating
power sector reform? To answer the first question, we take the case of Brazil where
hydroelectricity makes up 91% of its total (52,646 MW) installed capacity.5
While the shape of reform of Brazil's power sector is yet to be finalized, there is a
consensus among federal and state policy-makers and key operators that generation and
supply should be separated from its monopoly segments-transmission and
distribution-and awarded as concessions or sold to private investors. Unlike the cases of
United Kingdom, the United States, or Chile, however, the rules for making competition
2 Ibid
j Three versions of mass privatization were observed in Eastern Europe and former Soviet
Union. The first version, called 'rapid' case-by-case, was used in former East Germany.
The second version used in Poland and Kazakhsthan was carried out with the help of
intermediary mutual funds. The final kind was the voucher mass privatization used in the
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Russia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Kyrgyzthan.
4 In 1990, there were 60 countries with capacity less than 150 MW, thirty with capacity
between 150 and 500 MW, and seventeen with between 500 and 1,000 MW. See Bacon,
Robert, Restructuring the Power Sector: The Case ofSmall Systems, Industry and Energy
Department, The World Bank, June 1994.
' This data from 1994 was available from the case study materials on Brazil: Options for
reforming the electricity sector from the course, Infrastructure in Developing Countries,
Department of Urban Planning and Studies, MIT, Fall 1996.
work in Brazil's proposed wholesale generation market need to address two major
concerns:6 First, the government must ensure open entry and the long-term viability of
competition in the electricity sector by competitively allocating water rights. Without this
provision, there is the possibility of the water-rights owner to appropriate rents of all
downstream activities and, thus, create an entry barrier to competition.
Second, to provide incentives for investing in generating capacity, a pricing
mechanism must be put in place that will ensure recovery of the high sunk capital costs
characteristics of hydro systems. Intertemporal problems posed by water storage makes
the use of conventional energy pricing at costs (or bid) of the marginal plant impractical.7
One way of resolving this issue is to have two generation markets: a spot market, as in
other power sector models, that would be used to trade energy and determine short-run
marginal cost dispatch excluding fuel costs, and a contracts market where the hydro-
based generators would recover capital and fuel costs and that would send the price signal
for investment."
The second question concerns the feasibility of introducing competition at the
generation level in developing countries where the system capacity is small (less than
1000 MW). One argument against applying the principle of competitive bidding-
through spot markets-in large power systems to small ones is that the repeated bidding
mechanism is too complex for less-developed economies to administer. Proponents of
this argument recommend the use of contracts instead.' But, if contracts-usually long-
term in nature-are to be signed with existing or new generators the incentives for them
to increase efficiency and reduce costs to gain market share would be less. Enforcing
contracts to achieve economic efficiency would again demand strong administrative
6 Estache, Antonio and Rodriguez-Pardina, Martin, The real possibility of competitive
generation markets in hydro system-The case of Brazil, Public Policy for the Private
Sector Note No. 106, The World Bank, February 1997.
' Using the pricing rules such as those used in Argentina, Chile, and the United Kingdom
would result in highly volatile prices in Brazil, ranging from zero to the costs of unserved
energy as the system swings between excess water and drought conditions. Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Contracts could be leases or concessions. Leases are usually of shorter durations
compared to concessions.
capacity by the regulator, if not by a private independent entity. As establishment of
viable financial markets and institutional capacity are prerequisites for both the above
alternatives, it is up to individual governments to weigh them and chart out the
appropriate policy roadmap.' 0
Another concern in small-scale power systems is the dearth of IPPs in the
competitive procurement of generation. Too few players can lead to implicit collusion
and gaming. The arrangement in England and Wales, with two large private generators,
has already demonstrated that a large number of companies is required to induce truly
competitive behavior." Under such circumstances, the regulatory agency needs to ensure
that the size and cost structure of the generating plants are similar, and that no barrier to
entry exists for new IPPs. In countries where ownership of existing generation plants
continues to reside with the state and only additional capacity is procured competitively,
economic efficiency would dictate that the older plants also be subjected to commercial
behavior. This may be achieved by awarding management contracts, to the highest
bidding private entities, that allow for a performance-based regulation. 12
Finally, for competitive procurement of generation to be effective, it becomes
imperative to have excess generating capacity in the short run." If all plants are needed
on a regular basis, there is hardly any need for them to bid against each other. In
developing countries where supply-side constraints lead to frequent load-shedding, it may
be difficult to expect surplus capacity in the initial stages of IPP entry. It may, therefore,
be necessary that IPPs be required to build additional capacities that, in aggregate, exceed
0o In the long run, however, the financial markets would have to be matured and
regulators be independent and competent.
" Bacon, Robert, Restructuring the power sector: The case of small systems, Industry and
Energy Department, The World Bank, June 1994.
12 The advantages of management contracts, however, should not be overestimated. In
competitive markets, where privatization is relatively straightforward and political
opposition can be overcome, outright sale is likely to generate more benefits than
management contracts and without the costs of periodically renegotiating. See
Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics and Politics of Government Ownership, A
World Bank Policy Research Report, Oxford University Press, 1995.
'3 In a hypothetical world of perfect competition, there would be an infinite supply of
generating capacity and each generator would be a price taker.
the annual load demand growth. From the perspective of maintaining system reliability,
the excess capacity requirement, in effect, would act as a reserve margin.' 4 The cost of
reliability would, however, be reflected in the bid prices.
5.2 A Roadmap for Attracting Private Power Investors
Against this backdrop, the choice of technology and the size of electricity systems
have important ramifications on a country's approach to restructuring its power sector.
Unfortunately, experiences from developing countries that have applied the guiding
economic principles of competitive private-sector participation to a technology setting
quite different from, and to a system size that is only a fraction of those of, the "trail-
blazers" may not be expected for some time to come.
Our second assumption was that private-sector financing-based on balance-sheet
support-would provide cheaper and deeper capital in the long run. Once the
restructuring and/or divestiture of a developing country's electricity infrastructure are in
place, however, there is no assurance that corporate finance will be forthcoming. For
example, newly privatized companies or IPPs owned by local investors and institutions
are unlikely to have sufficient equity to finance expansion of their capacities. This usually
implies that they would have to rely on international debt.'5 Access to international
capital with no borrowing or repayment history makes it impossible, if not extremely
difficult, for these companies to mortgage utility assets to secure payments. The
14 System reliability does not, however, depend only on reserve margins. The crucial
element in maintaining overall reliability is to have a regional coordination of
transmission and distribution. This implies the need for some form of a central dispatch
as discussed in the GridCo (UK) and NEPOOL (New England, USA) models in Section
2.3.4.
" We saw in Chapter 4 that budding local capital markets initially require considerable
foreign capital flow through foreign direct investment and/or international debt to start
the growth momentum and induce domestic savings to sustain that growth. But often, the
lack of enthusiasm for local investors to channel their savings into private power is not
infrastructure-specific at all. This problem can be traced to the country's macroeconomic
instability characterized by domestic capital flight, exchange controls, and fiscal deficits
that crowd out private investment. See Lessons ofExperience: Financing Private
Infrastructure, IFC, Washington, DC, 1996.
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government sees no rationale in being the guarantor for this debt unless the state-owned
utility itself is the sole customer of these IPPs. The questions developing country policy-
makers, therefore, need to address are: What is the short-term approach to dealing with
project financing which is still, more or less, the prevalent rule than exception? And what
policy measures are to be taken to ensure a transition from project financing to corporate
financing? We tackle each of these questions next.
The solution to handling project finance in the short-run appears to lie in the
project developer's ability to finance country risk. As evidenced in Chapter 4, we found
that the typical debt-equity ratio of today's project finance market in developing countries
is 70:30. With this capital structure, private investors, to date, have been launching
projects by requiring the host government to guarantee that the rules of the game be
respected through specific support or implementation agreements.'6 Against this
background, two outcomes are possible. First, countries carrying out power sector
reforms will be extremely reluctant to meddle in a business that they are attempting to get
out of.'7 Second, countries that are not carrying out reforms are not likely to abide by
commercial principles of operation of its own power utility. These countries, therefore,
have hardly any credibility to be guarantors of IPP debt.
Under both these circumstances, commercial lenders may have to resort to export
credit agencies like, for example, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), Asian
Overseas Private Investment Corp. (OPIC), and various Export-Import Banks for some
form of risk cover. The IFC's syndicated loans (the B-loan program), in particular,
appears to be a promising vehicle for cushioning lenders against country risk. The
structure of these syndicate loans offer likely access to foreign exchange, a strong
historical performance record, and regulatory benefits."' Since the first signing of its
16 Bond, James, Risk and private power-A role for the World Bank, Private Sector FPD
Note No.1, The World Bank, March 1994.
'~ Even where reforms do not allow for divestiture of existing utility assets but allow for
commercialization within the given state-ownership structure, the government would not
want to undermine its own utility's commercial principles by forcing it to purchase power
from IPPs.
18 Under a B-loan structure, IFC becomes the sole lender of record to the project, acting
on behalf of both itself and participating banks. IFC is responsible for processing
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syndicated loan of US$6 million for Chile's power generation in 1992, IFC has signed 17
such loans totaling US$937 millions in the power sector up an till 1996.19 In some cases,
IFC's mere presence as a debt cofinancier in private power projects can also eliminate
need for syndicated loans for risk cover.20
At the end of the day, financial reforms would have to be implemented to move
on from the short-term financing measures listed above. There are three principle reasons
for carrying out these reforms in conjunction with, if not prior to, restructuring a
country's infrastructure. 21 First, restructured or divested enterprises with high expected
returns would require that the financial system allocate the necessary resources to them.
Participants in the financial market evaluate firms, managers, sectors, and business trends
in order to choose the most promising and creditworthy ventures. The better the financial
system is at obtaining and processing information, the better the allocation of capital.
Second, there needs to be a capital market where savings from private individuals,
banks, non-bank intermediaries, and other investment institutions can be channeled to
service expansion of power utility infrastructure. Well-developed financial systems can
both effectively mobilize savings and select promising firms to induce competition.
And finally, financial systems compel managers to act in the interests of those
who hold claims against the firm, i.e., stock, bond, and debt-holders. Moreover, good
corporate governance encourages more investment since investors and lenders feel more
confident that firms will maximize owner profits and service debt obligations.
What are the elements of effective financial system reforms? Evidences from
Chile, Korea, and Mexico suggest that reforms often proceeded in a two-track manner.
disbursements by participants, and for subsequent collection and distribution of loan
payments received from the borrower. Op Cit, footnote 14, IFC.
19 Ibid.
20 In Nepal's first ever IFC-financed US$140 million private project, IFC provided senior
and subordinated loans totaling US$31 million. The Norwegian aid agency, NORAD, is
making a US$5 million loan and guaranteeing most of a US$29 million loan from
Norway's export credit bank. This project is the first time that NORAD has provided
financing for a project without requesting a government counter-guarantee. Ibid.
21 Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, and Ross, Levine, The financial system andpublic enterprise
reform: Concepts and Cases, Policy Research Working Paper 1319, The World Bank,
Washington, DC, 1994.
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Initially, governments took steps to enhance supervisory and regulatory capacity, cut
back on directed credit programs, and reduced direct control of financial intermediaries.22
Liberalizing interest rates, formulating legal codes for enforcing contracts, abolishing
exchange controls, eliminating forced investment in government securities, removing
restrictions on nonbank financial institutions were the typical reforms that characterized
these countries. These were then followed by a reduction in the importance of state banks,
bank privatization, and the strengthening of private financial intermediaries. Deregulating
lending and deposit rates and opening up local capital markets to foreign participation
were some examples of such reforms. Meanwhile, mixed and poor performing countries
of financial system reforms have found to be unable to overcome a history of
subservience to state direction.23
All said and done, a committed government needs to ensure that its power sector
restructuring program is strengthened by a reformed financial system with the hope that
the former will, in turn, deepen market capitalization and, thus, lend credibility to the
country's financial system. Some key guidelines that may allow for this mutually
enhancing relationship are as follows:24
First, in IPP prequalification under competitive bidding, the regulator may wish to
give greater weight to those developers with businesses listed on a stock exchange and to
those with well-capitalized balance sheets. With this regulatory predilection, the strategic
goals of publicly held entities are likely to be more transparent and longer term because
of these entities' obligations to public shareholders.
Second, project sponsors should be encouraged to use balance sheet support for
subordinated debt and quasi-equity portions of the project financing plan in order to
22 Chile in the early 1980s and Mexico in the mid-1990s liberalized their financial
systems before a strong enough supervisory structure was in place, contributing to a
financial crisis, but both moved promptly to correct the problem. Op cit, footnote 11, The
World Bank Policy Research Report.
23 Egypt, a mixed performer, continues to have 50% of the country's financial assets in its
state-owned banks while India, a poor performer, has its state banks holding more than
90% of total banking assets. Ibid demonstrate that
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increase corporate financing. This strategy would ease the overall financing costs of
projects and could be a transitional strategy for meeting the huge financing needs for IPPs
in developing countries.
And finally, divestiture of commercially operating (and perhaps underperforming)
generation plants by incumbent utilities to IPP developers should be made a possible
policy alternative in the long run. These sales should be conditional on the purchaser's
commitment to making specified investments. By making positive revenue streams
available to IPP developers immediately, such transactions would give them the financial
base to invest in multiple plants.
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24 Jechoutek, Karl G. and Lamech, Ranjit, Private powerfinancing--From project
finance to corporate finance, Private Sector Notes No. 56, The World Bank, October
1995
6. Appendix
Table 6 a: Country Data
Country x x2 x3 yi Y2 Y3 w2 w Z
Algeria
Argentina
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belize
Benin
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Burkina Faso
Burundi
C.Afr.Rep
Cameroun
Cape Verde
Chile
China
Colombia
Congo
Costarica
Cyprus
Djibouti
Dominican rep
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Ethiopia
Fiji
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Jamaica
Jordan
Kenya
Korea
Lao P.D.R.
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
37
126 35
38
43
52
4
39
14
49
56 30
36
25
49
59
47
53
43
47
42
50
53
103 42
35
35
35
28
27
37
60
59
38
26 34
43
. 35
114 43
53
44
217 43
176 43
41
44
61
. 43
15
40 30
22 46
1.3753 91
0.636 90
87
. 100
100
100
86
1.8157 100
94
7.9236 100
100
100
96
71
80
100
95
100
99
98
100
1.1666 65
100
0.9343 98
95
83
85
100
93
98
96
2.9463 41
91
85
2.3016 95
97
88
1.1825 70
0.6446 66
89
98
90
1.642 100
0
54
7.3374 86
2.9013 92
4
2
3.75
1
1.25
3.75
2.5
1.5
2.5
5.5
6.5
5.5
6
3.75
2
7
3.25
5.75
1
2
5.5
2.5
2.25
4.75
3.5
6.25
5
3.75
2
5.75
3.75
5.5
5.5
5.5
2.5
2
3
5.5
2
4.5
6
2.5
6.5
5.25
6.75
4
6.5
1980
2790
220
6630
2010
380
650
2530
2940
290
210
1202
850
750
2160
370
1260
1120
1850
8640
1034
940
1000
610
1080
120
1930
3780
360
400
930
460
180
370
580
2720
330
610
1160
1050
340
6330
220
580
210
230
15.5
7.1
13.3
32
36.3
24
14.5
14.5
27
41.4
27
12.6
22
20.4
19.2
16.6
5.6
16
17
14.1
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Country xl x2 x3 Yl Y2 Y3 w2 wl Z
Malaysia
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Nepal
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guin.
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Rwanda
Sao Tome & Prin.
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Solomon Islands
Somalia
Sri Lanka
St. Lucia
St. Vincent & G.
Sudan
Swaziland
Syria
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Uruguay
Venezuela
Western Samoa
Yemen Rep.
Yugoslavia
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe
30
122
34
38
236
180
15.8.
106
91
4.9022 93
100
2.2891 85
89
85
95
75
10.56 95
87
7.25 100
99
83
93
45
100
69
93
91
0.6366 92
1.7045 92
97
83
98
100
58
75
100
100
100
100
70
67
77
95
90
50
1.4386 97
93
96
95
94
5.7447 90
92
96
78
91
95
3
2
1
1
3
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
7
122
34
121
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
2
1
1
1
1
11
1
1
3
1
3
1
4.5
5.25
6.5
1.75
4
4.5
5.5
7
3.25
3
5.5
4.75
4.25
3
2.5
3.25
3.75
3
2
1.25
5.25
6
3.75
3.5
6
5.5
1
7
4.5
1.5
1.5
7
5.5
7
5.5
3.75
5.75
4.75
3
5.75
1.5
2
2
5.5
5
5.75
4
4.75
2520
280
510
2410
3030
1030
80
180
460
300
340
400
2130
830
1270
1020
730
1790
5930
1390
270
394
720
5110
210
690
500
2492
1633
1381
1050
1160
100
1570
410
1500
1780
170
2840
2730
960
520
---
650
12.8
24
30
15
12.9
35
10.4
19.8
10.8
12.5
Legend:
x, = Customers per employee
x2= Generation capacity factor
x3 = Employees per GWh produced
y, = % Publicly owned assets
y2 = Magnitude of multiplicity
Y3 = Type of multiplicity
w, = Per capita GNP (surrogate for managerial capacity)
w2 = GASTIL index rating (regulatory capacity and transparency of decision-making)
Z = Percentage system losses
Note: All the data are from 1991.
Table 6 b: Summary of Analysis Results (t-statistics) for 1991
Dep. Const. y, Y2 Y3 W W2 X X2 x3 R
Var'ble
Z 57.94 -0.2 - - -.009 -3.08 -0.56 0.72
(11.27) (-2.27) (-3.09) (-2.57) (-0.96)
x, 158.22 - 47.14 -131.63 0.04 - -5.61 0.75
(3.99) (3.86) (-3.66) (1.87) (-1.22)
x2  51.59 -0.07 2.19 -3.46 -0.004 -1.32 - 0.20
(7.40) (-0.59) (0.92) (-0.61) (-0.83) (-0.73)
x, -1.59 0.07 0.09 0.16 -0.003 -0.44 - 0.56
(0.59) (1.67) (1.48) (0.15) (-2.18) (-0.74)
Table 6 c: Summary of Analysis Results (t-statistics) for 1988
Dep. Const. y, Y2 Y3 W, W2 X, X2 3 R2
Var'ble
Z 17.84 0.09 - - -0.005 0.08 -0.74 0.97
(2.4) (1.42) (-2.40) (7.45) (-1.47)
x, 45.51 - 0.67 7.79 0.02 - -0.47 0.27
(3.33) (1.88) (1.46) (1.54) (-1.02)
x2  21.72 0.08 0.06 0.74 0.006 -0.007 - 0.40
(2.68) (0.86) (0.71) (0.61) (2.55) (-2.30)
x, 17.94 -0.12 -0.03 0.16 -0.003 0.002 0.84
(2.68) (-1.69) (-0.38) (0.15) (-1.72) (7.82)
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Instrumental Variables Estimation:
Table 6 d: Impact of Provision Structure on System Losses (1991)
z= a+P33x3 + yY •1 +81 w, + 6w2 -+ l
x3 = a3 + Y3Yi + Y32Y2 + 733Y3 + +31WI + 5 32W2 + 3
Dependent variable: z
Independent Estimated Standard error t-statistics
variable coefficient
One 57.94 5.14 11.27
Y1 -0.2 0.09 -2.27*
w, -0.009 0.003 -3.09"'
w2 -3.08 1.2 -2.57'"
x3 -0.56 0.58 -0.96
"significant at 0.1 level; "significant at 0.05 level; '"significant at 0.02 level
N=13
Table 6 e: Impact of Provision Structure on System Losses (1988)
Independent Estimated Standard error t-statistics
variable coefficient
One 17.84 7.44 2.40
Y1 0.009 0.007 1.42
w, -0.001 0.0002 -2.40
w2 0.01 0.001 7.45
x3 -0.74 0.50 -1.47
N=46
Table 6 f: Impact of Provision Structure on Customers Per Employees (1991)
X, = a 1 + P 13X3 + YI2Y2 + Y13Y3 + +11W1  F1
X3 (a3 + 31X + 32X+ Y31YI + Y32Y2 + 733Y3 + 8 31W1 + 8 32W2 + 83
Dependent variable: x,
Independent Estimated Standard error t-statistics
variable coefficient
One 158.22 39.67 3.99
Y2 47.14 12.21 3.86"'
Y3 -131.63 35.98 -3.66^"
wl 0.04 0.02 1.87*
x3 -5.61 4.62 -1.22
'significant at 0.1 level; '"*significant at 0.01 level
N=14
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Table 6 g: Impact of Provision Structure on Customers Per Employees (1988)
Independent Estimated Standard error t-statistics
variable coefficient
One 47.51 14.27 3.33
Y2 0.67 0.35 1.88
Y3 7.79 5.34 1.46
w, 0.01 0.001 1.54
x, -0.47 0.47 -1.02
N=43
Table 6 h: Impact of Provision Structure on Generation Capacity Factor (1991)
x2 2 + Y721YI + Y22Y2 + 723Y3 + -- 21W1 + 822W2 + 82
Dependent variable: x2
Independent Estimated Standard error t-statistics
variable coefficient
One 51.59 6.97 7.40
y, -0.07 0.12 -0.59
Y2 2.19 2.38 0.92
Y3 -3.46 5.65 -0.61
W, -0.004 0.005 -0.83
w2 -1.32 1.81 -0.73
N= 13
Table 6 i: Impact of Provision Structure on Generation Capacity Factor (1988)
Independent Estimated Standard error t-statistics
variable coefficient
One 21.73 8.10 2.68
Y1 0.008 0.009 0.86
Y2 0.006 0.009 0.71
Y3 7.74 1.20 0.61
wi 0.001 0.0002 2.55
w2 -0.001 0.0003 -2.30
N =48
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Table 6 j: Impact of Provision Structure on Employees Per GWh Produced (1991)
X 3 = X3 -
+ y31YI + ,32Y2 + 3 733Y3+ 631w + 32W2 + 3
Dependent variable: x3
Independent Estimated Standard error t-statistics
variable coefficient
One -1.59 2.66 0.59
yi 0.07 0.05 1.67
y2 0.09 0.06 1.48
Y3 0.16 1.06 0.15
w, -0.003 0.001 -2.18*
w2 -0.44 0.59 -0.74
*significant at 0.1 level
N=15
Table 6 k: Impact of Provision Structure on Employees Per GWh Produced (1988)
Independent Estimated Standard error t-statistics
variable coefficient
One 17.93 6.70 2.68
Yl -0.12 0.007 -1.69
Y2 -0.003 0.007 -0.38
Y3 0.16 1.07 0.14
w, -0.0003 0.0002 -1.72
w2 0.002 0.0003 7.83
Sources:
(1) Wu, Gary and Heidarian, Jamshid, Power Sector Statistics for Developing Countries,
1987-1991, Industry and Energy Department, The World Bank, December, 1994.
(2) Energy Statistics Yearbook 1994, United Nations, 1996.
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Figure 6. 1: A Decision Tree for State-Owned Enterprise Reform
Introduce competition in markets
Management contracts pr
change rapidly
- auction the contract
Is divestiture possible?
Are SOEs potentially
competitive?I
- use performance-based
eferable where technology and taste do not
fees
ommitment mechanisms
- provlae c
Are contractual arrangementsE with the private sector possible?
Are natural monopolies
to be divested?
Is country ready
for SOE reform?
L--.. P nhance readiness
Unbundle large firms, increase competition in markets
Restrict soft credit, end subsidies and transfers
Ensure managerial autonomy to respond to competition
Use performance contracts selectively
- nsuire adeonhIte reT111Rtinr1c are in nbtcte
for SOE reform - unbundle large firms
- implement other reforms - auction the franchise
- reduce worker opposition - establish appropriate pricing regimes
- improve reputation, boost credibility - provide commitment mechanisms
Source: Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics and Politics of Government Ownership, A World Bank Policy Research Report, Oxford
University Press, 1995.
111
01
..
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This thesis is dedicated to my parents who have laid tremendous faith in me and to the
people of Nepal who have taught me humility and perseverance
I wish to express my deepest gratitude to the following people without whose
guidance and cooperation this document of truth would not have materialized. I am
intellectually indebted to Dr. Frannie Humplick whose Infrastructure in Developing
Countries course at MIT's Department of Urban Studies and Planning inspired me to
shape and develop my thesis under her guidance.
I am grateful to Dr. Richard Tabors who made every effort to ensure that I
produced a Technology and Policy thesis and not a development report. I pray that
dispassionate readers would bring in a favorable verdict.
I have also been a fortunate beneficiary of the vision and intellect of two
mentors-Dipak Gyawali and Bikash Pandey-who inspired me to do energy policy
research and, if favorable circumstances prevail, to make a living out it. I am glad that I
followed Bikash Pandey's advice on applying to MIT's Technology and Policy Program.
I thank Gail, Linda, Jennifer, and Rene at the Technology and Policy Program for
enlightening this ignorant soul by keeping me posted on the world inside of and outside
MIT.
Lastly, if there were to be a best roommate award, I would strongly recommend
candidacies of all of my six roommates at Chhahari. They preferred tolerance to
expulsion with regards to my demands for house rules and organization. This, in effect,
aided my academic pursuit.
